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Aware that activist judicial review is inconsistent with democratic theory
because it substitutes the policy choices of unelected, unaccountable judges for
those of the people's representatives, Professor John Hart Ely propounds a
more restricted theory in terms of insuring access to the political process.' On
first blush it seems a mere rehash of the Carolene Products footnote.2 But
where Justice Stone spun his footnote out of thin air, Ely would root it in the
3Constitution. Roughly speaking, Stone was concerned with legislation re-
stricting "political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation" or reflecting "prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities" tending to "curtail the operation of those political proc-
esses." 4 Already others are questioning Ely's analysis on jurisprudential and
empirical grounds; 5 I shall examine his uses of history.
He states his theory succinctly: "[U]nblocking stoppages in the demo-
cratic process is what judicial review ought preeminently to be about, and de-
nial of the vote seems the quintessential stoppage." 6 Justice Harlan truly af-
firmed, however, that the Warren Court's "one person-one vote" interpreta-
tion was "made in the face of irrefutable and still unanswered history to the
contrary" 7 -the framers' unmistakable exclusion of suffrage from the four-
I. 1. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 5, 8, 45 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ELY]. Ely has performed a
service in laying bare that the activist view, that in enforcing the Constitution the judge should use his "own
values ... .is a methodology that is seldom endorsed in so many words." Id. at 44 (emphasis in original). He
considers an "appeal to some notions" not "found ... in the Constitution ... especially vulnerable to a
charge of inconsistency with democratic theory." Id. at 5. The "transparent failure of the dominant mode of
.non-interpretivist "' review leads Ely to come forward with his theory. Id. at 41. Ely candidly comments that
"democratic decision quite consistently generates value choices with which many of us, myself included, rather
fervently disagree." Id. at 248.
2. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). See Tushnet, Darkness at the
Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1045-46 (1980)
("According to Ely, the footnote ... *has not been adequately elaborated.' Unfortunately, he contributes little
that is new.") See also Taylor, Due Process Under Review, N.Y. Times, March 16, 1980, § 7 (Book Review), at
11.
3. For the genesis of the footnote, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 275-78 (1977). Professor George Braden wrote that the footnote "is
simply part of one man's set of values," which he is "willing to enforce when the opportunity arises." Braden,
The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Lo', 57 YALE L.J. 571, 581 (1948).
Ely has written that if a "neutral and durable principle.., lacks connection with any value the Constitu-
tion marks as special, it is not a constitutional principle and the Court has no business imposing it." Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 949 (1973).
4. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
5. Tushnet considers that Ely's "critique of the prevailing theories can be turned, point for point, against
his own theory. in particular, representation-reinforcing review necessarily invokes judicial displacement of
citizens' choices between political and other kinds of activity, in the name of the objective value of political
participation." Tushnet. Darkness at the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional
Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1040 (1980). See text accompanying notes 330-32 infra. See also Leedes, The
Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1361, 1422-37 (1979).
6. ELY, supra note 1, at 117.
7. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965).
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teenth amendment-a fact increasingly acknowledged by activist commen-
tators.8 When I read Ely's devastating attack on the activist tenet that judges
are oracles of moral values, diviners of social consensus,9 his assertion that
"our society did not... move to near-universal suffrage ... [to] have super-
imposed on popular decision the values of first-rate lawyers-"--a conclusion
that I share-I wondered why he should label views expressed in my con-
firmatory study of Harlan's evidence as "incredible," "bordering on per-
versity." " Now I understand; the framers' exclusion of suffrage from the
fourteenth amendment constitutes an insurmountable barrier to interference
with state "political processes." In his efforts to tear down this barrier, Ely
twists, bends, and distorts the historical facts to fit his theory. And he com-
pounds the offense by ignoring my documented refutation of his earlier pub-
lished opening chapters. 2 A scholar who would appraise the historical record
must take account of discrepant evidence and opposing inferences; 3 Ely fails
dismally on both counts. Throughout, he prefers speculation to fact, a favor-
able utterance to preponderant evidence to the contrary, as I shall again
document in detail. That task is the more essential because his book has been
hailed by respected academicians as "the single most important contribution
to the American theory of judicial review written in this century," as a "daz-
zling intellectual performance .... a rare achievement.""4 With so influential
an imprimatur, Ely's faulty history may become "incorporated into that col-
lection of fixed beliefs and settled opinion that governs the conduct of
affairs." "
8. Lusky, Book Review, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 403, 406 (1979), refers to"Justice Harlan's irrefutable
and unrefuted demonstration in dissent that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to protect the right to
vote." See also Alfange, On Judicial Policymaking and Constitutional Change: Another Look at the "Original
Intent" Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603, 622 (1978); Abraham, Book
Review, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 467, 468 (1979); Mendelson, Book Review, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 437,
452-53 (1979); Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TEx. L. REV. 579, 581 (1978); Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 685, 687 (1978).
Paul Brest remarks that "the adopters of the equal protection clause probably intended it not to encompass
voting discrimination at all." Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV.
204, 234 n. 115 (1980). Even Ely concedes that "it does seem probable that most of the framers (and ratifiers) of
the Fourteenth Amendment did not specifically anticipate that its first section would be applied to voting
rights," but contends that Harlan's "specific intentions of the framers" should yield to the "overriding inten-
tion . . . to state a general ideal" of equality, ELY, supra note I, at 118-19, which he conjures out of the blue. It
is elementary that the general must give way to the specific.
9. Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 16,49,51(1978). See ELY,
supra note I, at 67, 102, 219 n.112.
10. Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 38 (1978).
1I. Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 434 n. 129, 436 n. 133
(1978). See also ELY, supra note I, at 200 n.70.
Should the reader consider my own strictures too severe, consider that Ely labels as "gibberish" and
"nonsense," ELY, supra note I, at 32, 140, 121, some reasoning of his "carefully chosen hero." Chief Justice
Warren, id. at dedication, states that the Court "made itself look quite silly," id. at 19, charges Justice Field
with "schizophrenia," id. at 24, adverts to the Court's -'infatuation" with a faulty analysis, id. at 106, and labels
the results of certain decisions a "disaster," id. at 19. betraying a "transparent lack of principle," id. at 109.
12. Berger, Government hy Judiciary: John Hart Ely's "Invitation," 54 IND. L.J. 277 (1979).
13. SIR H. BUTTERFIELD, GEORGE III AND THE HISTORIANS 225 (1969).
14. Professors Henry P. Monaghan and Gerald Gunther, respectively. See ELY, supra note I. dust jacket.
But compare Gunther, Some Reflections on the Judicial Role: Distinctions, Roots and Prospects, 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 817, 825 quoted in note 71 infra.
15. Wiggins, Lawyers as Judges of History, 75 MASS. HIST. SOC. PROC. 84, 104 (1963).
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Ely's unreliable historicism is speedily illustrated by his treatment of the
fifteenth amendment, ignoring my demonstration that it is incompatible with
historical fact. Seizing on my statement that "the key to an understanding of
the Fourteenth Amendment is that the North was shot through with Negro-
phobia, that the Republicans, except for a minority of extremists, were
swayed by the racism that gripped their constituents," 16 Ely challenges the
implication that in consequence the framers
could not conceivably have intended to draft a provision capable one day of
supporting the inference that blacks were entitled to vote.... Curiously lacking is
any attempt whatever to account for the fact that the Fifteenth Amendment,
explicitly granting blacks the vote, was proposed and ratified only two years
later.... Of course this suggests that the framers didn't think Section I of the
Fourteenth Amendment had had that effect.... It is extremely damaging, how-
ever .... to Berger's general claim of the dominance of "Negrophobia."' 7
Ely concedes that "racism of the sort that supported separate schools was
into the 1950s (and remains today) a strong strain in American life," that
"recognition that there was racism in society doubtless was one reason the
framers chose open-ended language capable of development over time,"'18
that is, they did not dare reveal a purpose to thwart popular sentiment. Con-
sequently, it is Ely who is perverse in reiterating that "the claim that race
prejudice is 'the key' to interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment is one that
borders on perversity. -1
9
If the framers "didn't think" that the fourteenth amendment granted
black suffrage-the central issue-whether or not Negrophobia was dominant
is beside the point. Numerous statements by the framers attest that the
fifteenth amendment was necessary because suffrage was excluded from the
fourteenth, 20 as Ely confirms in acknowledging that the fifteenth amendment
"opens the [voting] process to persons who had previously been excluded. ' 21
Nevertheless he reasons that "the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment so
soon after the Fourteenth is one reason ... that the lack of any specific
expectation that the earlier provision would apply to voting should not mean it
16. ELY, supra note 1. at 200 n.70, quoting R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 10 (1977).
17. ELY, supra note 1, at 200 n.70 (emphasis in original).
18. Id. at 66, I. 201 n.70.
19. Id. at 201 n.70.
20. For citations, see Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light From the Fifteenth, 74 NW. U.L. REV.
311, 321-23 (1979). To quote only Senator Jacob Howard, the proposed fifteenth amendment "is the only
attempt which has been made since the foundation of the Government to interfere with this right of the States to
prescribe the qualifications of voters." CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 985 (1869).
2 1. ELY. supra note I. at 98. Ely notes that five of our last ten constitutional amendments "have extended
the franchise ... to persons who have previously been denied it." Id. at 7, 99. These extensions, he argues,
reflect a "strengthening constitutional commitment to the proposition that all qualified citizens are to play a role
in the making of public decisions," id. at M,* "the achievement of a political process open to all on an equal
basis," id. at 99. But as Professor Robert Bork observes, "'[tihat expansion was accomplished politically, and
the existence of a political trend cannot by itself give the Court warrant to carry the trend beyond its own limits.
How far the people decide not to go is as important as how far they do go." Bork, The Impossibility of Finding
Welfare Rights in the Consuitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695, 698. In contrast, Ely urges: "We cannot trust the
ins to decide who stays out, and it is therefore incumbent on the courts to ensure.., that no one is denied the
vote for no reason .... - ELY. supra note I, at 120.
1981]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
shouldn't be interpreted to do So." 2 2 There was more than "lack of any
specific expectation"; there was an unmistakable intention to exclude suf-
frage from the scope of the fourteenth. Thus Ely would read into the four-
teenth what had been excluded and therefore, according to the testimony of
the fifteenth's framers, required a fresh amendment, an extraordinary in-
terpretation deriving from his need to ground his "political access" theory on
the fourteenth amendment, for the fifteenth applies to blacks alone. He him-
self rejects as "gibberish both syntactically and historically" Chief Justice
Warren's reading of the fourteenth's equal protection back into the fifth. To
read the fifteenth back into the fourteenth is no less "gibberish."
Since Ely's "borders on perversity" poses the issue of scholarly trust-
worthiness, a few more facts are in order. In 1866 George Julian, an Indiana
Radical, lamented in the House that "the real trouble is that we hate the
negro," 24 an "almost ineradicable prejudice" noted by others.2 "[N]o man
can doubt," said Senator John Sherman, that "there was a strong and power-
ful prejudice ... among all classes of citizens against extending the right of
suffrage to negroes.", 26 The 1865-1868 rejection of suffrage by seventeen
states2 7 explains Senator Jacob Howard's statement that "three-fourths of the
States of this Union could not be induced to vote to grant the right of suf-
frage."-2 8 During the pendency of the fifteenth amendment, Senator Henry
Wilson, a Massachusetts Radical, stated: "There is not today a square mile in
the United States where the advocacy of the equal rights and privileges of
those colored men has not been in the past and is not now unpopular." 29 To
argue that "recognizing racism in one's constituents and being racist oneself
are not equivalent ' 30 is grasping at straws. Members of Congress "did not
intend to risk drowning by swimming against the treacherous current of racial
prejudice and opposition to Negro suffrage."'" A Reconstruction historian,
Morton Keller, observes that "most congressional Republicans were aware of
(and shared) their constituents' hostility to black suffrage." 3 2 Abatement, let
22. ELY, supra note I, at 236 n.37. Ely reiterates: "The lack of any specific expectation that the Fourteenth
Amendment would be applied to voting seems unusually irrelevant in light of the ratification of the Fifteenth
Amendment two years later," which "was supported by essentially the same people as the Fourteenth." Id. at
119-20.
23. Id. at 32.
24. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 257 (1866) (emphasis omitted).
25. Citations are collected in R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 13 (1977).
26. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess., App. 131 n.24 (1866).
27. Oregon v. Mitchell. 400 U.S. 112, 256 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
28. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2766 (1866).
29. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 672 (1869). "Neither the anti-slavery controversy, nor the Civil
War, nor the inconclusive political maneuvering of Reconstruction made any basic changes in the prevailing
attitudes toward race .... attributes clearly reflected in the congressional politics of Reconstruction." Nye,
Comment on C.V. Woodward's Paper, in NEW FRONTIERS OF THE AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION 148, 156
(H. Hyman ed. 1966). But for Nye, the citations from notes 24-29 hereof were called to Ely's attention in
Berger, Government by Judiciary: John Hart Ely's "Inwitation," 54 IND. L.J. 277, 286, 307 (1979).
30. ELY, supra. note 1, at 201 n.70.
31. W. GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 25 (1965).
32. M. KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE 67 (1977). See also Nye, Comment on C. V. Woodward's Paper, in
NEW FRONTIERS OF THE AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION 148 (H. Hyman ed. 1966).
Senator John Sherman said in the Senate: "[[W]e do not like negroes. We do not conceal our dislike.'"
Woodward, Seeds of Failure in Radical Race Policy, in NEW FRONTIERS OF THE AMERICAN RECONSTRUC-
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alone absence, of racial prejudice does not therefore serve to explain the
adoption of the fifteenth amendment. Instead it was a response to political
exigencies.
Throughout, the leading object of the Republicans was to prevent the
return to power of the slavocracy, because the combination of Southern and
Northern Democrats could control Congress and elect a President.33 The
primary goal of the fifteenth amendment, Professor William Gillette con-
cluded, was enfranchisement of Negroes "outside the deep South" in order to
obtain the necessary swing vote of blacks in the North. A secondary ob-
jective, he wrote, "was to protect the southern Negro against future dis-
franchisement," for it had become apparent that military occupation must
come to an end and continued control must rest on Negro voters,34 again
aimed to perpetuate Republican ascendancy. My own recent study of the
history of the fifteenth amendment confirms that the drive for its adoption was
political in origin. 35 Thaddeus Stevens, the leader of the Radicals, began draft-
ing the amendment "to save the Republican party from defeat .... , 36 Senator
Oliver Morton, who had opposed Negro suffrage, now embraced it "as a
political necessity."-3 7 The motivation, in short, was "largely political, not
humanitarian, in origin. 01 In reiterating his charge that my analysis founders
on the fifteenth amendment without taking account of my demonstration that
his inferences are contrary to historical fact, 39 Ely betrays a determination to
maintain an erroneous theory at all costs.
Because the framers' unmistakable exclusion of suffrage from the four-
teenth amendment is "fatal ' 40 to Ely's attempt to root judicial control of
"political processes" in the Constitution, it will be useful to recapitulate a few
facts against which to measure his attempts to explain them away. Justice
Brennan observed that "17 or 19" Northern States had rejected black suf-
frage between 1865 and 1868. 4' Consequently, Roscoe Conkling, a member of
the Joint Committee on Reconstruction of both Houses, which drafted the
amendment, stated that it would be "futile to ask three quarters of the States
TION 128 (H. Hyman ed. 1966). In an article published in THE NATION, August 2, 1866, Thomas G. Shearman
wrote: "The members from Indiana and Southern Illinois well knew that their constituents had barely overcome
their prejudices sufficiently to tolerate even the residence of negroes among them, and that any greater liberality
would be highly repulsive to them." Quoted in 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 1283 n.246
(1971).
Against these and many other similar statements, Ely's reference to "racially prejudiced thinking of a sort
we understand the Fourteenth Amendment to have been centrally concerned with eradicating," ELY, supra
note I. at 243 n. II. substitutes wishful thinking for historical fact.
33. R. BERGER. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 15-16 (1977).
34. W. GILLETTE. THE RIGHT TO VOTE 46-47, 49-50 (1965). For additional citations, see Berger, The
Fourteenth Amendment: Light From the Fifteenth, 74 NW. U.L. REV. 311, 317 n.34 (1979).
35. Berger. The Fourteenth Amendment: Light From the Fifteenth, 74 NW. U.L. REV. 311 (1979).
36. W. GILLETrE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 34 (1965).
37. Id. at 57.
38. Id. at 146.
39. ELY, supra note I, at 201 n.70; Berger, Government by Judiciary: John Hart Ely's "Invitation," 54
IND. L.J. 277, 307-08 (1979).
40. 1 borrow "fatal" from ELY, supra note 1, at 119. 198 n.64.
41. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
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to do ... the very thing which most of them have already refused to
do .. . Another member of the Committee, Senator Howard, spoke to the
same effect.43 Senator William Fessenden, Chairman of the Joint Committee,
said of a suffrage proposal that there is not "the slightest probability that it
will be adopted by the States . . . ."44 The unanimous Report of the Joint
Committee doubted that "the States would consent to surrender a power they
had exercised, and to which they were attached," and therefore thought it
best to "leave the whole question with the people of each State." 45 That such
was the vastly preponderant opinion is confirmed by a remarkable fact: during
the pendency of ratification, radical opposition to readmission of Tennessee
because its constitution excluded Negro suffrage was voted down in the
House by 125 to 12; and Senator Charles Sumner's parallel proposal was
rejected by thirty-four to four,46 indicating that even the radicals did not
believe that suffrage was covered by the fourteenth amendment. A bevy of
activists concur that suffrage was excluded, as was segregation.47 To insist
against such facts the "legislative history is in unusual disarray," that there
exists no "reliable picture" of the ratifiers' intentions,4 is to bury one's head
in the sand. The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he opinions of some mem-
bers of the Senate, conflicting with the explicit statements of the meaning of
the statutory language made by the Committee reports and members of the
committees on the floor. . . , are not to be taken as persuasive of the Con-
gressional purpose." 49 And it is downright misleading to read this history as "it
does seem probable that most of the framers (and ratifiers) of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not specifically anticipate that its first section would be ap-
plied to voting rights," 50 in the face of repeated assurances that suffrage was
excluded.
42. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 358 (1866).
43. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
44. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 704 (1866). For additional citations, see R. BERGER. GOVERN-
MENT BY JUDICIARY 58-60 (1977).
45. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. xiii (1866), quoted
more fidly in R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 84 (1977).
46. For details, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 56, 59-60, 79 (1977).
47. See note 8 supra and note 67 infra. Such is the evidence, corroborated by many other statements,
marshalled by Justice Harlan, and confirmed by R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 52-63 (1977). about
which Ely asserts that Harlan's "evidence [is reduced] to certain statements that § I was not intended to cover
voting, but such statements are few and far between." ELY, supra note 1, at 235 n.36. His reference to "'few"
statements that section 2 indicated that section I excluded suffrage is discussed in text accompanying notes
58-62 injra. Presumably Ely would reject effectuation of the framers' determination as "historically strait-
jacketed literalism," as referring "society's substantive value choices ... to the beliefs of people who have
been dead for over a century." ELY, supra note I, at 2. See also id. at vii.
48. ELY, supra note 1, at 16, 17. See also id. at 119. Ely twits those who believe "'contraception yes--
voting no,"' id, at 117, but one may ask him, a caustic critic of the contraception decision, why "contraception
no-voting yes?" Justice Harlan considered the reapportionment cases as a "'much more audacious and
far-reaching judicial interference with the state legislative process ... than the comparatively innocuous use of
judicial power in the contraceptive case."' So Professor Paul Kauper paraphrased the Harlan view. R.
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 392 (1977).
49. United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 125 (1942). See also Union Starch & Ref. Co. v.
NLRB, 186 F.2d 1008, 1012 (7th Cir. 1951).
50. ELY, supra note I, at 118.
[Vol. 42:87
ELY'S THEORY
Although Ely notes that the ratifiers did not anticipate that section 1
applied to suffrage-the popular hostility to suffrage required minimally that
they be advised that it did apply-Ely quotes Thomas Cooley to the effect that
the people are not supposed to "have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning
in the words employed," a lesson that Berger allegedly has yet to learn."
There was no occasion to search for a "dark or abstruse meaning" or for the
intention of the ratifiers, for the evidence is that on the suffrage issue framers
and people were as one. Senator Sherman, it will be recalled, referred to "the
strong and powerful prejudices ... among all classes of citizens against ex-
tending the right of suffrage to Negroes." 52 Philip Paludan considers that the
fourteenth amendment "was presented to the people as leaving control over
suffrage in state hands, as representing no change in previous constitutional
conditions., 53 The Joint Committee Report which so stated was widely dis-
tributed. 4 William Gillette wrote that "white Americans resented and re-
sisted" Negro suffrage, and that "Negro voting in the North was out of the
question, ' 55 as rejection of Negro suffrage by seventeen to nineteen states
should amply prove.
In the face of these facts, it would be a "dark and abstruse meaning" to
read the very suffrage rejected by the people into the amendment. To the
contrary, the facts raise a presumption that the framers spoke for the people
and were endorsed by the ratifiers. 6 Let Ely show that the sentiments of the
ratifiers were contrary to those of their representatives in Congress, the
framers. Instead he altogether ignores their unanimity.
To discredit Justice Harlan's conclusion that the equal protection clause
"simply had not been intended by its framers to apply to voting," Ely cites
Harlan's quotation of Bingham's statement:
51. Id. at 18. 191 n.25.
52. See text accompanying note 26 supra. See also text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
53. P. PALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH 52 (1975).
54. A. AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENT DEBATES vi (1967).
55. W. GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 27, 32 (1965). See also text accompanying note 42 supra.
Another member of the Joint Committee, Senator George W. Williams of Oregon, stated:
"[T]he people of these United States are not prepared to surrender to Congress the absolute right to
determine as to the qualifications of voters in the respective States, or to adopt the proposition that all
persons, without distinction of race or color, shall enjoy political rights and privileges equal to those
now possqssed by the white people of the country. Sir, some of the States have lately spoken upon
that subject. Wisconsin and Connecticut. northern, loyal and republican States, have recently de-
clared that they would not allow the negroes within their own borders political rights; and is it
probable that of the thirty-six States more than six, at the most, would at this time adopt the
constitutional amendment proposed by the gentleman?... Put it before the country and commit the
Union party to it, the amendment will be defeated and the Union party overwhelmed in its support-
and the control of the government would pass into the hands of men who have more or less sympa-
thized with the rebellion; and I say that it is of more consequence, in my judgment, that the control of
the Government should remain in the hands of the men who stood up for the Union during the late
war than that any constitutional amendment should be adopted by which the right of suffrage should
be extended to any person or persons not now enjoying it." CONG. GLOBE, 39thCong., Ist Sess., S.
App. 95 (1866).
56. Dellinger. School Segregation and Professor Avin's History: A Defense of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 38 MISS. L.J. 248, 250 n.6 (at 251) (1967).
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The second section excludes the conchsion that by the first section suffrage is
subjected to congressional law; save, indeed, with this exception, that as the right
of the people in each State to a republican government and to choose their Repre-
sentative in Congress is [one] of the guarantees of the Constitution, by this amend-
ment a remedy might be given directly for a case supposed by Madison, where
treason might change a State government from a republican to a despotic govern-
ment, and thereby deny suffrage to the people. 57
The second clause, Ely maintains, is "fatal" to Harlan's claim that "§ I of the
Fourteenth Amendment just doesn't apply to voting. 58 For the moment, let
us defer the republican form issue and note that Bingham's italicized clause
expressed the general sentiment. So, Senator Howard stated: "The second
section leaves the right to regulate the elective franchise still with the States,
and does not meddle with that right." 59 In the House, James Blaine stated:
"The effect contemplated.., is perfectly well understood, and on all hands
frankly avowed. It is to deprive the lately rebellious States of the unfair
advantage of a large representation in this House, based on their colored
population, so long as that population shall be denied political
rights .... Give them the vote or lose representation," 60 as section 2 pro-
vides. There were many such utterances; 6' and the framers of the fifteenth
amendment, who included many framers of the fourteenth, repeatedly noted
that section 2 testified to the exclusion of suffrage from the fourteenth. 62
Here as elsewhere, Ely prefers a tortured reading of one utterance to many
unequivocal voices to the contrary.
The unreliability of his historical pronouncements is again exemplified by
his remark: "It plainly shouldn't have required a constitutional amendment to
extend the vote to women, and today it wouldn't, but in 1920 the Equal
Protection Clause had scarcely been discovered, let alone applied to vot-
57. ELY, supra note 1, at 118-19, citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 598-99 (1964)(Harlan. J., dissent-
ing)(emphasis by Harlan, J.).
58. Id. at 119. Ely states: "That essentially reduces Harlan's evidence to certain statements that § I was not
intended to cover voting, but such statements are few and far between, a fact that seems devastating in light of
the facial breadth of the provision." Id. at 235 n.36. Thus does Ely brush aside the Committee Report, the
statements by committee members and its chairman, to which the Court gives decisive effect. See text ac-
companying notes 41-48 supra. The evidence is collected in R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 52-68
(1977). Consider Ely's doubts in light of James Garfield's statement about the amendment: 'I profoundly regret
that we have not been enabled to write it [suffrage] and engrave it upon our institutions, and imbed it in the
imperishable bulwarks of the Constitution as a part of the fundamental law of the land," but was willing -when I
cannot get all I wish to take what I can get." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2462 (1866).
59. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2766 (1866). Howard stated on behalf of the Joint Committee, "It
was our opinion that three fourths of the States ... could not be induced to vote to grant the right of suffrage.
even in any degree or under any restriction, to the colored race." Id. See also note 20 supra.
60. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 141 (1866).
61. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 64-68 (1977).
62. For numerous citations, see Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light From the Fifteenth, 74 NW.
U.L. REV. 311, 319, 321 (1979). Asserting that "the legislative history is not as clear as Harlan claimed it was."
Ely cites an article by Professor William Van Alstyne and an opinion by Justice Brennan in reliance on that
article, ELY, supra note I, at 119, 235 n.36, ignoring my detailed refutation of Van Alstyne in 42 pages and of
Brennan in 8 more. Such omissions are the more serious in view of current activist acceptance of Harlan's proof.
See note 8 supra.
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ing." 63 The discovery was like Justice Field's earlier discovery of the uses of
economic due process, for as Professor Herbert Packer observed, "the new
.substantive equal protection' has under a different label permitted today's
justices to impose their prejudices in much the same manner as the Four
Horsemen once did.''64 Sweet are the uses of "discovery." If women's suf-
frage "required" no constitutional amendment, it must be because it was
comprehended by the fourteenth amendment. Plainly, however, it was ex-
cluded by the framers. A proposal to extend suffrage to women in the District
of Columbia, said Senator Lot Morrill, "would contravene all our notions of
the family"; 65 it was rejected by Senator Henry Wilson and others. 66 Even the
apostle of Negro suffrage, Senator Sumner, voted against the inclusion of
women, leaving it to be dealt with in "the future."-67 A unanimous Report of
the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1872 rejected the claim of Elizabeth Cady
Stanton and other feminists that they were entitled to vote by virtue of the
fourteenth amendment, stressing that the fifteenth "would have been wholly
unnecessary if the fourteenth had secured to all citizens the right to vote,"
6
as the Supreme Court reiterated in Minor v. Haperstett.69 It is no answer to
point to the Warren Court's application of the equal protection clause to
voting,70 for the legitimacy of that action is the very point in issue: may the
63. ELY. supra note 1. at 237 n.43. As late as 1927, Justice Holmes stated that the claim that state
legislation violates the equal protection clause is "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments." Buck v.
Bell, 274 U.S. 200. 208 (1927).
64. Packer, The Aim of the Criminal Law Revisited: A Plea for a New Look at "Substantive Due Process,"
44 S. CAL. L. REV. 490, 491-92 (1971).
65. A. AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENT DEBATES 250 (1967). See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 130. 141 (1872)(Bradley, J.. concurring), quoted in ELY, supra note I. at 51.
66. A. AVINS. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENT DEBATES 251 (1%7). See also id. for statements
made by Senators Williams and Yates.
67. Id. at 255. Professor Charles Fairman notes that women urged Congress to include them, "the only
remaining class of disfranchised citizens," but that "[tlo the abolitionists women suffrage was extra luggage
they were not willing to bear." 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 1263-64 (1971).
68. A. AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENT DEBATES 572 (1%7).
69. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175 (1874).
70. ELY, supra note I. at 117-19. Of the same order is Ely's appeal to Chief Justice Warren's statement in
the desegregation case that the legislative history relating specifically to schooling was "'inconclusive."' Id. at
119. This was merely a dodge to escape the impact of the history. Professor Philip Kurland wrote that in "Brown
the Court abandoned the search for the framers' intent.. and chose instead to write a Constitution for our
times." Kurland, Brown v. Board of Education Was the Beginning, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 309, 313.
One need only recall James Wilson's assurance to the framers that the Civil Rights Act did not comprehend
mixed schools, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1117 (1866), that repeated attempts to procure desegre-
gated schools in the District of Columbia failed. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 123-24 (1977). that
Senator Sumner, the unflagging champion of desegregated schools, proposed during the course of the debates
on the fifteenth amendment to add a phrase outlawing "discrimination in rights on account of race ... "
correctly insisting that "if the clause [fourteenth] is inadequate to protect persons in their.. .right to vote, it is
inadequate to protect them in anything,"CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1008 (1869). He failed. For
documentation, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 117-33 (1977). Activist Professor Nathaniel
Nathanson wrote that Bickel "quite conclusively demonstrated" the framers' intention that the fourteenth
amendment would not require desegregation, and that "Berger's independent research and analysis confirms
and adds weight to these conclusions." See Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TEX. L. REV. 579, 581 (1978).
Professor Henry J. Abraham considers that the framers of the amendment "specifically rejected its application
to segregated schools." Abraham, Book Review, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 467, 467 (1979). See also Perry,
Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 687-88 (1978). A perfervid activist, Professor A. S. Miller, considers it
"rather doubtful that the historical record is so 'inconclusive' as Chief Justice Warren asserted .... Miller &
Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661,674 n.48 (1960). Again
and again Ely refuses to face unpalatable facts.
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Court displace the framers' unmistakable exclusion of suffrage by its own
values.7' It will be instructive to follow the convoluted path by which Ely
arrives at the Carolene footnote.
INTERPRETIVISM V. NONINTERPRETIVISM
Ely labels the opposing camps interpretivism-enforreable norms are
derived from the Constitution-and noninterpretivism-norms drawn from
outside the document. 72 The noninterpretivist, he says, "would have politi-
cally unaccountable judges select and define the values to be placed beyond
majority control .... , By insisting that neutral principles must be rooted in
the Constitution, 74 by his quest for constitutional footing for his "political
access" theory, Ely seems to ally himself with the interpretivists. But that is
illusory, for apparently he is critical of referring our "substantive value
choices ... to the belief of people who have been dead for over a century,"
because not "reconcilable with the underlying democratic assumptions of our
system." 75 For the argument that "[t]he people have chosen the princi-
ple.., and have written it down in the text of the Constitution for the judges
to interpret and apply ' 76 is "largely a fake.",77 Originally Ely labelled the
"ratification" argument a "fake" because "the Constitution is not the voice of
the people; it is the voice of the framers." 78 But the framers submitted the
Constitution to "the people" for ratification in order that the Constitution, in
Madison's words, would be "established by the people themselves, ' 79 by
means, said Rufus King, of "a reference to the authority of the people ex-
pressly delegated to [State] Conventions." 80 Ely notes that ratification was "a
close thing"; 81 "[w]ithin a few weeks after the Constitution was made public,
71. 'It would not do to derive the legitimacy of representation-reinforcement from ... the one-man-one-
vote cases because these cases themselves require justification and cannot be taken to support the principle
advanced to support them." Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH.
U. L.Q. 695, 698.
"The ultimate justification for the Reynolds ruling is hard, if not impossible, to set forth in constitutionally
legitimate terms. It rests, rather, on the view that courts are authorized to step in when injustices exist and other
institutions fail to act. That is a dangerous--and I think illegitimate-prescription forjudicial action." Gunther.
Some Reflections on the Judicial Role: Distinctions, Roots and Prospects, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 817. 825.
72. ELY, supra note I, at I.
73. Id. at 8.
74. See Ely quotation in note 3 supra, quoting Ely. The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 949 (1973). Ely's colleague, Professor Frank Michelman. says that Ely's argument
"ties its premises into the documentary Constitution." Michelman. Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Demo-
cracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659, 665.
75. ELY, supra note I, at vii. Acknowledging that "the states are not directly covered by the First
Amendment," he asserts that "rights like these, whether or not they are explicitly mentioned, must nonetheless
be protected [by judges], strenuously so. because they are critical to the functioning of an open and effective
democratic process." Id. at 105.
76. Id. at 9, quoting Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703. 705 (1975).
77. Id. at If.
78. Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399. 412 (1978).
79. 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OFTHE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 93 (1911). See also id. at
88-94.
80. Id. at 92.
81. Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399. 409 (1978).
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the people were sharply aligned in two parties for or against it." 8 2 And he notes
that "once the Constitution was ratified ... virtually everyone in America ac-
cepted it immediately as the document controlling his destiny," S3 as the au-
thentic "voice of the people." Now he argues chiefly that in requiring ratifica-
tion by two-thirds of Congress and three-fourths of the states for adoption of an
amendment, the framers "fatally undercut the idea that in applying the Con-
stitution ... judges are simply applying the people's will." 84 Ely does not
explain this assertion and I find it baffling. Before or after amendment, the
Constitution represents the will of the people, which judges are duty-bound to
"apply." Would approval by a bare majority better evidence the people's will
than does two-thirds of the Congress and three-fourths of the states? Amend-
ment sub rosa by unelected judges surely does not better represent the will of
the people. Ely anticipates that some may regard him as a noninterpretivist,
though he apparently considers his position the golden mean and brushes
nomenclature aside as unimportant. 5 One can be for the Constitution or
against it, but not for both at the same time; fuzzy definition conduces to
fuzzy thinking. With Professor Gary Leedes, I regard Ely's "model as a
belated apology for Warren Court activism, ' 86 and shall show that the ninth
and fourteenth amendments he relies on have been broken on the Procrustean
bed of his theory.
At the outset Ely notices that a judge's attempt to go beyond the pur-
poses of a statute to enforce "fundamental values" would verge on "lunacy,"
and that constitutional interpretation may be governed by similar considera-
tions.87 He notes that substitution of judicial policy for that of the political
branches is "especially vulnerable to a charge of inconsistency with demo-
cratic theory": 88 "rule in accord with the consent of a majority of those
governed is the core of American government." 89 And he concludes that
-[a]n untrammeled majority is indeed a dangerous thing, but it will require a
heroic inference" to regard "enforcement by unelected officials of an 'unwrit-
ten constitution' . . . [as] an appropriate response in a democratic re-
public. 90
What is his "heroic inference"? The fourteenth and ninth amendments
contain a "quite broad invitation to import into the constitutional decision
82. C. VAN DOREN, THE GREAT REHEARSAL 179 (1949).
83. Ely. Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure a,,d Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 409 (1978).
84. ELY, supra note I, at 11. But compare Packer, The Aim of the Criminal Law Revisited: A Plea for a
New Look at "'Substantive Due Process," 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 490, 491-92 (1971), quoted in text accompanying
note 64 supra. (1971).
85. Id. at 88.
86. Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1361, 1422 (1979).
87. ELY, supra note I. at 3-4. 186 n. 11. For framers* application of rules of statutory construction to
constitutional interpretation, see Berger, "'Government by Judiciary":Judge Gibbons' Argument Ad Hominem,
59 B.U. L. REV. 783. 805-06 (1979).
88. ELY, supra note 1. at 5.
89. Id. at 7. Originally Ely noted a third consideration: "'[V]ague and untethered standards" constitute a
'virtually irresistible temptation- to impose one's own personal predilections. Ely, Constitutional Interpretiv-
ism: Its Allure and Impossibility., 53 IND. L.J. 399, 403 (1978).
90. ELY, supra note I, at 8.
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process considerations that will not be found in the language of the amend-
ment or the debates that led up to it." 9' In plain words, these amendments
were designed to serve as a blank check to future judges. This "invitation,"
however, is so "frightening" 92 that Ely concludes, "[i]f a principled approach
to judicial enforcement of the Constitution's open-ended provisions cannot be
developed, one that is not hopelessly inconsistent with our nation's com-
mitment to representative democracy, responsible commentators must con-
sider seriously the possibility that courts simply should stay away from
them." 93 Presumably his appeal to the Carolene theory is meant to supply the
principles that will cabin "untethered discretion." What "frightens" him at
the distance of 100 years must even more have deterred the framers, acutely
distrustful of the courts, and little minded to empower them to override the
framers' determination to exclude suffrage. 94 Men do not employ words to
defeat their purposes.95
ELY'S "INVITATION" AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Ely repudiates the Court's resort to substantive due process, emphasiz-
ing that due process is procedural and contains no "invitation to substantive
oversight."96 With this I agree. For Ely the answer may be found in the words
themselves: "the word that follows 'due' is 'process.' No evidence exists that
'process' meant something different a century ago from what it does now.'97
The interpretive criterion is what did the words mean to those who used
them,98 and for this there is no need to speculate. On the eve of the Conven-
tion, Hamilton, accurately summarizing 400 years of English and colonial
history, 99 declared: "The words 'due process' have a precise technical im-
port, and are only applicable to the process and proceedings of the courts of
justice; they can never be referred to an act of [the] legislature." "° As to the
respective functions of "due" and "process," the statute 25 Edw.III (1352)
provided in relevant part that "none shall be taken ... unless it
be ... by Process made by Writ original ... [and] unless he be duly brought
91. Id. at 14. My extended analysis of this "invitation" was published in Berger, GoverunmentbyJudiciary:
John Hart Ely's "Invitation,'" 54 IND. L.J. 277 (1979).
92. ELY, supra note I, at 23. So too, an "open-textured" reading of the ninth amendment can "get pretty
scary." More fully quoted in text accompanying note 246 infra. Again, "once 'due process' is reinvested with
serious substantive content, things get pretty scary. ... ELY, supra note I. at 20 (emphasis in original).
93. Id. at 41.
94. For citations and discussion, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 221-29 (1977); Berger.
The Fourteenth Amendment: Light Fromx the Fifteenth, 74 NW. U.L. REV. 311, 350-53 (1979).
95. Justice Holmes held that when a legislature "has intimated its will, however indirectly, that will should
be recognized and obeyed .... it is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: We see what you are
driving at but you have not said it." Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (Ist Cir. 1908); Keifer & Keifer v.
R.F.C., 306 U.S. 381, 391 n.4 (1939). To the same effect, see statement by Judge Learned Hand in Cawley v.
United States, 272 F.2d 443, 445 (2d Cir. 1959).
96. ELY, supra note I, at 18, 15-18.
97. Id. at 18.
98. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 363-72 (1977).
99. Berger, "Law of the Land" Reconsidered, 74 NW. U.L. REV. 1 (1979).
100. 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds. 1962).
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to Answer," 0' that is, service of process in proper form. This and still other
sources remove the need for speculation. My study of the 1866 debates con-
vinced me that the framers had the accepted procedural meaning in mind;
0 2
Ely remarks that the debates are "devoid of any reference that gives the
provision more than a procedural connotation. "' 03 We might therefore hold
with Chief Justice Marshall that "to establish a principle never before recog-
nized, [it] should be expressed in plain and explicit terms."104
But, opines Ely, "[t]hings are seldom so simple .... particularly where
the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned"; ,05 and
he dwells on Wynehamer v. People (1856) and Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857),
where substantive due process was articulated.3 6 Although he states that
these cases "were aberrations, neither precedented nor destined to become
precedents themselves," he cautions that "one cannot absolutely exclude the
possibility that some of [the framers], had the question been put, would have
agreed that the Due Process Clause they were including could be given an
occasional substantive interpretation. "' 07 Such is the "nonsense"308 by which
Ely would obscure "the intent of the framers." It is a skewed approach to
construction to suggest that a hypothetical possibility that some framers
might have entertained "substantive" notions be absolutely excluded. In his
own words, "it should take more than occasional aberrational use to establish
that those who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment had an eccentric definition
in mind."109 Nor is Ely's renunciation of due process wholehearted, for he calls
for invalidation if "due process of law making" by the legislature was de-
nied," " ignoring Hamilton's declaration that the words "can never be referred
to an act of the legislature," being confined to procedure in judicial proceed-
ings.
ELY'S "INVITATION" AND THE "PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES" CLAUSE
The "privileges or immunities" clause says Ely, "seems on its face to
convey the sort of substantive review authority" missing from the due proc-
ess clause, "a delegation to future constitutional decision-makers to protect
rights that are not listed either in the Fourteenth Amendment or elsewhere in
101. Statute of Purveyors, 25 Edw. III, st.5, ch.4(1350) (emphasis added). See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY 197-98 (1977).
102. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 201-06 (1977). See also Berger, The Fourteenth Amend-
ment: Light Front the Fifteenth, 74 NW. U.L. REV. 311, 334-35 (1979). For example, James Wilson stated:
"The citizen is entitled to the right of life, liberty and property. Now if a State intervenes and deprives him,
without due process of law, of these rights .... have we no power to make him secure in these priceless
possessions." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 1294 (1866).
103. ELY. supra note I, at 15.
104. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 165 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693).
105. ELY, supra note I. at 15-16.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
108. So Ely describes an opinion of Chief Justice Warren. Id. at 121.
109. Id. at 18.
110. Id. at 138.
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the document.""' Unfortunately, "it has to all intents and purposes been
dead for a hundred years," having been aborted by the Slaughter House
Cases,"2 in an interpretation that "persists to the present day." "3 Thus, Ely
would invest the Court with "frightening" discretion by a clause from which
it has turned its face for over one hundred years. Then there is the fact, Ely
notes, that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause is directly concerned with equality
(and it is no small problem for the suggested interpretation of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause that it would render the Equal Protection Clause superflu-
ous)."114 It is in fact an insurmountable problem because the draftsmen are
"presumed to have used no superfluous words"; a contrary construction is to
be rejected." 5 Even so, he concludes that "the slightest attention to the
language will indicate that it is the Equal Protection Clause that follows the
command of equality strategy, while the Privileges or Immunities Clause
proceeds by purporting to extend to everyone a set of entitlements.""
' 6
Nevertheless, he considers the clause "quite inscrutable, indicating only that
there should exist some set of constitutional entitlements not explicitly
enumerated in the document," and he seeks "guides to construction.
"' 7
How can the framers' unmistakable determination to exclude suffrage be
overcome by this "inscrutable language"; how can "inscrutable language" be
construed as an "invitation" to judges to reverse the framers' intention?" 8
Ely does not explain. In truth he muddies the waters, for the framers made
quite plain the limited scope of the privileges or immunities clause.
Inquiry starts with the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which proceeded on a par-
allel track with the amendment in the thirty-ninth Congress, which was enacted
at the same session, and which the amendment was designed to embody and
Ill. Id. at 22, 30.
112. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
113. ELY, supra note 1. at 22.
114. Id. at 24. Justice Stone wrote of a suggested interpretation that "it would seem to add nothing to the
guarantee of the equal protection clause .... In that case discourse upon the privileges and immunities clause
would appear to be a gratuitous labor of supererogation.'" Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404. 447 (1935)
(dissenting, joined by Brandeis and Cardozo, J.J).
115. Platt v.Union Pac. R.R., 99 U.S. 48,58-59 (1878); Adler v. Northern Hotel Co.. 175 F.2d 619, 621 (7th
Cir. 1949).
116. ELY, supra note 1, at 24.
117. Id. at 98.
118. In an analogous situation the Court, per Justice Douglas, stated: "'The response of the Congress to the
proposal to make municipalities liable for certain actions being brought within federal purview by the Act of
April 20, 1871, was so antagonistic that we cannot believe that he word 'person' was used in this particular Act
to include them." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961)(footnote omitted).
Justice Miller stated that the privileges and immunities clause did not contemplate the "'transfer [of]the
security and protection of all the civil rights we have mentioned from the States to the Federal goverment.' that
despite "'the excited feeling growing out of war, our statesmen have still be ieved that he existence of the States
with powers for domestic and local government, including the regulation of civil rights-the rights of person and
property-was essential... ." And he declined to embrace a construction that would so degrade the states and
subject them to "'the control of Congress ... in the absence of language which expresses such a purpose too
clearly to admit of doubt. " Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77, 82. 78(1872). See also Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967); United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 55, 165 (C.C. Va. 1807)(No. 14.693)(per
Marshall, C.J). Bingham, draftsman of the fourteenth amendment, rejected the antecedent "civil rights and
immunities" precisely because it was so "oppressively" broad. See text accompanying notes 130-33 infra.
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protect from repeal. Charles Fairman justly wrote that they were treated as
"essentially identical"; 1 9 for example, George Latham of West Virginia
stated that the Act "covers exactly the same ground as this amendment."'
20
Henry Raymond said the Congress proposed by the Civil Rights Bill "to
exercise precisely the powers which that [Bingham] amendment was intended
to confer." 12' Harry Flack, a devotee of a broad construction of the amend-
ment, wrote, "nearly all said it was but an incorporation of the Civil Rights
Bill .... there was no controversy as to its purpose or meaning," 22 and I
found no contradictory remarks in the records. Flack was echoed by others.1
23
In Reiche v. Smythe, 24 the Court held that if two acts are in pari materia, "it
will be presumed that if the same word be used in both, and a special meaning
were given it in the first act, that it was intended it should receive the same
interpretation in the latter act, in the absence of anything to show a contrary
intention." "'2
i 19. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 44
(1949).
120. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2883 (1866).
121. Id. at 2502.
122. H. FLACK. THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 81 (1908).
123. Howard Jay Graham. an ardent activist, wrote that [vJirtually every speaker in the debates on the
Fourteenth Amendments-Republicans and Democrats alike-said or agreed that the Amendment was designed
to embody or incorporate the Civil Rights Act." H. GRAHAM. EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION 291 n.73 (1968).
For citations to similar remarks by Alexander Bickel, Jacobus tenBroek and Benjamin Kendrick, see R.
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 23 n.13 (1977). Ignoring such evidence, confirmed by the holdings of
Justices Bradley and Field that the two were equivalent, see text accompanying notes 147-50 infra, Ely argues
that "equivalence in coverage is not established either by the undeniable premise that the two 'bore an ex-
tremely close relationship' to one another.. or by the equally undeniable fact that part of the purpose of the
amendment was to provide an impeccable constitutional basis for the Act." ELY, supra note I, at 198 n.66. But
it is established by the framers' statements that they were "identical." In an effort to downgrade the evidence,
Ely states that "there were some [initially he said "'rare," Ely Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and
hupossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 434 n. 129 (1978)] actual statements of equivalence, though generally couched in
terms that made clear the speaker's understandable desire to minimize the potentially radical sweep of the
constitutional language." ELY, supra note I, at 199 n.66 (emphasis added). Those statements were never
contradicted or challenged. And why does Ely disparage "some" actual statements here while worrying that
"one cannot absolutely exclude the possibility that some" of the framers might have harbored substantive due
process notions? See text accompanying note 109 supra. His gloss-an "understandable desire to minimize the
radical sweep of constitutional language," ELY, supra note I, at 199 n.66-euphemistically defends hoodwink-
ing the public; it condones concealment of radically sweeping designs from a constituency that would reject
them if made plain, as with suffrage and segregation.
Impervious to the impact of facts on his theorizing, Ely repeats his charge, "The shorthand that the
amendment 'embodied' the act is used by Berger in accordion fashion. Introduced to mean that the amendment
was intended to 'remove doubts as to [the Act's] constitutionality and to place it beyond the power of a later
Congress to repeal' . . . ,at other points it is invoked to suggest equivalence of coverage .... This sort ofelision
permeates Berger's argument." ELY, supra note 1, at 199 n.66. It is sorry scholarship which can repeat such
canards without taking account of my reply: "Ely ... confuses two separate analytical strands. The framers'
desire to protect the act constituted the motiration for the Amendment; the 'equivalence' goes to an entirely
different issue-the scope of the Amendment." Berger, Government by Judiciary:John Hart Ely's "Invitation,"
54 IND. L.J. 277, 295 (1979). That Ely is constrained to distort the evidence that the framers regarded Act and
Amendment as "identical" betrays the shakiness of his argument. Finally, whether or not they were "identical,"
an interpreter may not construe the Amendment in contradiction of the Act "embodied" therein.
124. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 162 (1871).
121. Id. at 165. Summarizing Harry Flack, Justice Black, architect of the "'incorporation" doctrine, stated:
"'The declarations and statements of newspapers. writers and speakers ... show very clearly.... the general
opinion held in the North. The opinion, briefly stated, was that the Amendment embodied the Civil Rights
Bill."' Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 110 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The Civil Rights Act of 1866
The Civil Rights Bill provided in pertinent part:
[T]here shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities among the inhabit-
ants ... on account of race, but the inhabitants ... shall have the same right to
make and enforce contracts, to sue .... to hold and convey real and personal
property, and full and equal benefits of all laws and proceedingsfor the security of
person and property .... 126
Martin Thayer of Pennsylvania stated that "to avoid any misapprehension"
as to what the "fundamental rights of citizenship" are, "they are stated in the
bill. The same section goes on to define with greater particularity the civil
rights and immunities which are to be protected by the bill.' ' 2 7 And, he
added, "when those civil rights which are first referred to in general terms in
the bill are subsequently enumerated, that enumeration precludes any possi-
bility that the general words which have been used can be extended beyond
the particulars which have been enumerated." 128 There were similar restric-
tive explanations.2 9 "Civil rights or immunities" was therefore to have a re-
strictive meaning. Notwithstanding such assurances, John Bingham, a drafts-
man of the fourteenth amendment, protested that the "civil rights and im-
munities" phrase was "oppressive," that it would "embrace every right that
pertains to the citizen as such" and strike down "every State constitution
which makes a discrimination on account of race or color in any of the civil
rights of the citizen." 3 0 In short, he opposed striking down all racial discrimi-
nations, and at his insistence the phrase was deleted, as James Wilson, chair-
man of the House Judiciary Committee explained, to obviate a "construction
going beyond the specific rights named in the section," 131 "a latitudinarian
construction not intended." 3 2 Ely does not explain why Bingham, who re-
jected "civil rights and immunities" as "oppressive," turned around and
adopted "privileges or immunities," which Ely considers "a delegation to
future constitutional decision-makers to protect certain rights that the docu-
ment neither lists, at least not exhaustively, nor in any specific way gives
directions for finding." 1
33
126. A. AVINS. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENT DEBATES 121 (1967) (emphasis added).
127. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1151 (1866) (emphasis added).
128. Id.
129. For citations, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 27-31 (1977).
130. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866) (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 1367.
132. Id. at 1366. William Lawrence stated that Bingham placed on the 'civil rights and immunities** of the
Civil Rights Bill, "'an interpretation different from the committee who reported it. But for the purpose of
obviating his objection this clause was stricken out." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1837 (1866). In
Georgia v. Rachel, 348 U.S. 780,791-92(1966). the Court stated, "'The legislative history of the 1866 Act clearly
indicates that Congress intended to protect a limited category ofrights .... mhe Senate bill did contain ageneral
provision forbidding discrimination in civil rights and immunities preceding the specific enumeration of
rights.... Objections were raised in the legislative debates to the breadth ofthe rights of racial equality that might
be encompassed by a prohibition so general .... [A]n amendment was accepted [in the House] striking the
phrase from the bill."
133. ELY, supra note I, at 28.
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Instead he turns for his "quite inscrutable" formula to a number of red
herrings, preferring to the framers' own unequivocal explanation a rambling
"dictum" of Justice Bushrod Washington in Corfield v. Coryell (1823),1 34 on
which Raoul Berger allegedly "places great reliance in his book, as having
construed the Article IV provision narrowly." 35 Instead of relying on it, I
took great pains to show that its holding was narrow. 36 At issue was the
meaning of article IV, § 2; the antecedent thereof was article IV of the Articles
of Confederation, which entitled inhabitants of the different States "to all
privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states ... [to] enjoy
therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties,
impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof .... ',13 For the
founders, the enumerated "privileges of trade and commerce" limited the
general "privileges and immunities."' 38 Article IV of the Constitution bor-
rowed the "privileges and immunities" phraseology; and two early cases
construed the words in terms of "trade or commerce." So Judge Samuel
Chase, soon to be appointed to the Supreme Court, held on behalf of the
Maryland Court in Campbell v. Morris (1797) 39 that the words had a "particu-
lar and limited meaning," that is, the "peculiar advantage of acquiring and
holding real as well as personal property," which were to have the "same"
protection as that of the state citizens.4 Speaking for the Massachusetts
Court, Chief Justice Parker held in Abbott v. Bayley (1827) 14, that the article IV
phrase allows an out-of-state citizen to "take and hold real estate," to "sue and
be sued," but not "the right of suffrage." 42
Ely ignores these cases and seizes on Justice Washington's Corfield
dictum because Washington made a "fatal [to Berger] reference to the right
'to pursue and obtain happiness and safety,"' and in "essence ... feels 'no
134. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)(No. 3.230). Ely notes that this "'was the opinion of a single justice, it
was dicttn.'" ELY. supra note I. at 29 (emphasis in original).
135. ELY. supra note I. at 198 n.64.
136. R. BERGER. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 31-33 (1977).
137. H. COMMAGER. DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY III (7th Ed. 1%3) (emphasis added).
138. Madison stated: "'For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these
and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general powers? Nothing is more natural or common
than first to use a general phrase, and to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars." THE FEDERALIST
NO. 41 at 269 (J. Madison)(Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
139. 3 H. & McH. 535 (Md. 1797).
140. Id. at 554.
141. 6 Pick. 89 (Mass. 1827).
142. Id. at 91. Consequently Ely misstates the import of article IV: "'This was an equality provision,
intended to keep states from treating outsiders worse than their own citizens." ELY, supra note 1. at 23. And he
says article IV represents - *simply"' the guarantee that "-whateLer entitlements those living in a state see fit to
vote themselves will generally be extended to visitors." Id. at 83 (emphasis added). For his own oracle, Bushrod
Washington held that an out-of-stater could not dredge for oysters. As Judge Chase held, the words had a
"limited meaning." Compare Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298. 319 (1957), in which Justice Harlan stated:
"We should not assume that Congress... used the words 'advocate' and 'teach' in their ordinary dictionary
meanings when they had already been construed as terms of art carrying a special and limited connotation."
Chief Justice White stated in United States v. Wheeling, 254 U.S. 281, 294 (1920), that "the Constitution plainly
intended to preserve and enforce the limitations as to discrimination imposed by Article IV of the Articles of
Confederation .... the text of Article IV, § 2 of the Constitution makes manifest that it was drawn with reference
to the corresponding clause of the Articles of Confederation and was intended to perpetuate its limitations."
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hesitation in confining' privileges and immunities to everything but the
kitchen sink."1 43 Notwithstanding, Washington held that a Pennsylvania citi-
zen could not dredge for oysters in Delaware waters, drastically limiting the
"pursuit of happiness" in Delaware. Although Washington generously threw
in suffrage, Senator Lyman Trumbull, draftsman of the Civil Rights Bill,
said, "[tihis judge goes further than the bill," including "the elective
franchise. "'44
After reading from the several cases, Trumbull stated that "the great
fundamental rights set forth in this bill... [are] the right to acquire property,
the right to go and come at pleasure, the right to enforce rights in the courts, to
make contracts, and to inherit and dispose of property. These are the very
rights that are set forth in this bill,"' 45 as its text corroborates. Justice Field
stated, and the record bears him out, that Corfield v. Coryell "was cited by
Senator Trumbull with the observation that it enumerated the very rights
belonging to a citizen of the United States set forth in the first section of the
act." 146 Ely would substitute for the particularized enumeration of the bill,
which Thayer and Trumbull so carefully stressed, an overblown 1823 dictum
that is contrary to the framers' intention, as Trumbull plainly indicated.
That the particularization of the Act was incorporated in the "privileges
or immunities clause" was the holding of Justice Bradley in 1870: "[T]he civil
rights bill was enacted at the same session, and but shortly before the presen-
tation of the fourteenth amendment .... [it] was in pari materia; and was
probably intended to reach the same object .... the first section of the bill
covers the same ground as the fourteenth amendment." ' 147 What Bradley
thought "probable" was in fact the uncontradicted view of the framers that
Act and amendment were "identical." Led by Justice Field, the four dis-
senters in the Slaughter House Cases148 asked: "What then are the privileges
and immunities which are secured against abridgement by State legisla-
143. ELY, supra note I. at 198 n.64.
144. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 475 (1866). Professor Fairman comments, "It would have
sufficed for Justice Washington to say, simply, that the visitor had no constitutional right to share in the public
patrimony, such as oyster beds .... Doubtless Justice Washington's words, as reported, far overleaped his
thought." It would "have been preposterous" to suppose "that he meant" that the framers intended to widen the
Article of Confederation obligation "to charge each State to accord to citizens from sister States whatever the
Supreme Court might hold to be 'fundamental' in 'free governments,' regardless of whether the State made any
such provision for its own citizens [much less to compel States to make such provisions for its own citizens by an
Article referring to those of sister States]." 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OFTHE SUPREME COURTOFTHE UNITED
STATES 1122-23 (1971). See also notes 156 and 159 infra.
145. Id. Ely stresses that "the significance for a responsible interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment is
the fact that that amendment's framers repeatedly adverted to the Corfield discussion as the key to what they
were writing." ELY, supra note 1, at 29 (emphasis in original). He ignores references to the other cases which
construed article IV narrowly, and Trumbull's own identification of Corfield with the privileges enumerated in
the Act. Trumbull was chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and draftsman of the Act.
146. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 98 (1872)(Field, J., dissenting).
147. Live Stock Dealers & Butchers Ass'n v. Crescent City Live Stock Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 655 (C.C.D.
La. 1870)(No. 8.408). It is a marvelous feat, against this background, to convert the "inscrutable" privileges or
immunities clause, see text accompanying note 117 supra, into a "guarantee of virtual representation to the
virtually powerless." ELY, supra note I, at 91.
148. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
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tion," 49 and answered: "In the first section of the Civil Rights Act Congress
has given the interpretation of these terms .... [including] the right 'to make
and enforce contracts [etc.].'"5
Against this background, to insist that the "statute and the ... constitu-
tional provision, say very different things," and "the choice of a vague or
open-ended term should, in the absence of contrary evidence, be assumed to
have been conscious,"' 5' is to prefer "inscrutability" to the unmistakable
understanding of the framers. It perverts the historical intention to argue that
"one way of ensuring substantial equality is by designating a set of goods that
no one can be denied," 52 and to urge that "the cause of equality for blacks"
was "the amendment's overall animating purpose." 5 3 For the framers made
emphatically plain that only the enumerated "goods" were protected against
discrimination, as will even more clearly appear in the subsequent discussion
of the equal protection clause.
Ely moves beyond protection from discrimination to argue that the privi-
leges or immunities clause "seems to announce rather plainly that there is a
set of entitlements that no state is to take away," 54 "which states are not to
deny to anyone." 5  After the historical facts to the contrary were set before
him,156 one might expect that Ely would abandon his "entitlements" reading;
but no, his pet theory is impervious to fact. The bill, Shellabarger explained,
"secures . . .equality of protection in those enumerated civil rights which the
States may deem proper to confer upon any races." 157 Trumbull declared that
"if the State of Kentucky makes no discrimination in civil rights between its
citizens, this bill has no operation whatever in the State of Kentucky." 5 8 And
he reiterated that it "in no manner interferes with the municipal regulations of
any State which protects all alike in their rights of person and property."' 159
Thaddeus Stevens, leader of the Radicals, stated that the amendment
149. Id. at 96.
150. Id.
151. ELY. supra note I. at 199 n.66 (emphasis in original).
152. Id. at 23.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 25.
156. See Berger, Government by Judiciary: John Hart Elv's "'nL'itation,*" 54 IND. L.J. 277, 298-99 (1979).
Professor Charles Fairman labels as "preposterous" the notion that the framers meant to "charge each State to
accord to citizens from sister States whatever the Supreme Court might hold to be 'fundamental' in 'free
governments' regardless of whether the States made any such provision for its own citizens. At any rate, it
would have taken much more than a dictum from a Justice on circuit [in Corfield v. Cor'ell] to establish such a
proposition." 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OFTHE SUPREME COURT 1123 (1971). Justice Miller held that article
IV did not "profess to control the power of the State governments over the rights of its own citizens." "Its sole
purpose" was to prevent discrimination against out-of-state visitors with respect to rights granted to residents,
and this despite citing Corfield v. Coryell. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77, 75-76 (1872).
157. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.. Ist Sess. 1293 (1866) (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 600.
159. Id. at 1761. In 1873 the Court declared per Justice Miller: "[Tlhe most liberal advocates of the rights
conferred by that amendment have contended for nothing more than that the rights of the citizens previously
existing, and dependent wholly on State laws for their recognition, are now placed under the protection of the
Federal Government." Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129. 133 (1873). On behalf of his three fellow
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allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far that the law
which operates on one shall operate equally upon all. Whatever law punishes a
white man for a crime shall punish the black man precisely in the same way....
Your civil rights bill secures the same thing.160
Such was the purpose embodied in the fourteenth amendment, as a Recon-
struction historian that Ely cites has written: "Instead of formulating posi-
tively national civil-rights minima ... the Amendment forbade unequal de-
privation of the broad, uncodified mass of civil rights protections which a
State professed to afford .... ,,161
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights
Ely seeks to revive Justice Black's view that the Bill of Rights was
incorporated in the fourteenth amendment, but the Court itself, as Thomas
Grey observed, "clearly has declined" to accept "the flimsy historical evi-
dence" proffered by Black. 62 A fastidious scholar, Charles Fairman, Bickel
wrote, "conclusively disproved Black's contention; at least such is the weight
of opinion among disinterested observers." 163 Now Ely stamps that view as
"voguish," but it "isn't so voguish any more," citing Alfred Kelly and
dissenters in the Slaughter House Cases, Justice Field stated, "The Amendment does not attempt to confer any
new privileges or immunities upon citizens." 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 95 (1872).
Further confirmation is furnished by Senator William Stewart's explanation that the purpose of the Civil
Rights Bill "is simply to remove the disabilities existing by laws tending to reduce the negro to a system of
peonage. It strikes at that; nothing else." If all the Southern States, he continued, will repeal such laws. "this civil
rights bill ... will simply be a nullity. When peonage in all its forms is abolished ... your bill has no operation."
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1785 (1866).
160. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (emphasis added). In the House, Shellabarger said of
the antecedent Civil Rights Bill, "Its whole effect is not to confer or regulate rights, but to require that whatever
of these enumerated rights and obligations are imposed by State laws shall be for and upon all citizens
alike .... "Id. at 1293. 1st Sess. 1293 (1866). So too, Giles Hotchkiss of New York was willing to provide "that
no State shall discriminate between its citizens" but opposed an attempt "to authorize Congress to establish
uniform laws ... upon the subject named, the protection of life, liberty and property." Id. at 1095. In the
House, William Lawrence explained that the Civil Rights Bill "does not confer any civil ight .... all these are
left to the States. But it does provide that as to certain enumerated civil rights" what "may be enjoyed by any
shall be shared by all citizens in each State." Id. at 1832. His New York colleagues, Robert Hale and Thomas
Davis, shared Hotchkiss' view, and the proposal was jettisoned. For discussion, see R. BERGER, GOVERN-
MENT BY JUDICIARY 185-87 (1977).
161. H. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION 467-68 (1973) (emphasis added). What Ely misses was per-
fectly understood by Horace Burchard of Illinois in the 1871 debates: the equal protection clause "does not
enjoin upon the State that it shall provide protection by its laws, but that it shall not discriminate in that
protection." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 315 (1871). Justice Field held that the fourteenth
amendment "only limits discriminating and partial enactments, favoring some to the impairment of the rights of
others," and does not transfer "to the federal government the protection of all private rights." Butchers' Union
Co. v. Crescent City Co., Ill U.S. 746, 759 (1884)(concurring opinion). See note 159 supra.
Ely himself notices, without appreciating the effect on his "entitlements" argument, that "Article IV
conveys no set of substantive entitlements, but 'simply' the guarantee that whatever entitlements those living in
a state see fit to vote themselves will generally be extended to visitors." ELY, supra note i. at 83. The intention
of the framers of the fourteenth amendment to protect only a set of enumerated privileges from discrimination is
even more clearly documented.
162. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV 703, 711-12 (1975).
163. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 102 (1962). See Fairman, Does tire Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
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Howard Jay Graham, two arrant wishful thinkers.' 64 He considers that the
"legislative history argument is one neither side can win," and balances
Black's argument that the "privileges or immunities" clause was an "emi-
nently reasonable way of expressing the idea that henceforth the Bill of Rights
shall apply to the States," against "a point that seems equally strong on the
other side .... the incorporation would include the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause would
be superfluous."' 65 The latter point is incontrovertible; the former "emi-
nently" unreasonable. The "privileges and immunities" of article IV ante-
dated the Bill of Rights; it assured out-of-staters that the states could not
discriminate against them in matters of "trade or commerce." Self-evidently,
it could not include the later Bill of Rights, which largely was designed to
protect all individuals against deprivation by the federal government of hal-
lowed criminal procedural rights. A contemporaneous construction by a Re-
port of the House Committee on the Judiciary in 1871 repels "incorporation":
The clause of the fourteenth amendment, "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,"
does not in the opinion of the committee, refer to privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States other than those privileges and immunities embraced
in the original text of the Constitution, article 4, section 2. The fourteenth amend-
ment, it is believed, did not add to the privileges or immunities before men-tioned .... 166
Then too, the derivation of the "privileges or immunities" clause of the
fourteenth amendment from the limited Civil Rights Act,' 67 the repeated ex-
planations that the "civil rights and immunities" clause deleted therefrom
was qualified by the enumerated rights that followed, make it utterly un-
reasonable to read the Bill of Rights into the clause.
164. ELY. supra note I. at 25. For documentation with respect to Kelly and Graham, see R. BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY Index (1977). Ely overlooks Kelly's tacit recantation: under the impact of an
"extraordinary revolution in the historiography of the Civil War and Reconstruction," he wrote that "the
essentially federal character of the American constitutional system .. made it impossible to set up a compre-
hensive and unlimited program for the integration of the negro .... [it] meant that the radical Negro reform
program could be only a very limited one." Kelly, Comment on Harold M. Hyman's Paper, in NEW FRON-
TIERS OF THE AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION 40, 55 (H. Hyman ed. 1966). Ely's own tendentiousness is
revealed by his characterization of Professor Stanley Morrison's closely reasoned critique of Justice Black's
views as a "strident attack." ELY, supra note I, at 15.
165. ELY. supra note I at 27. In Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,535 (1884), the Court observed of the
fifth amendment due process clause that "when the same phrase was employed in the 14th Amendment ... it
was used in the same sense and with no greater extent ...." Although Ely states, "It is quite clear that the
original framers and ratifying conventions intended the Bill of Rights to control only the actions of the federal
goverment," ELY, supra note I, at 37, he opines that the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment
provides "special protection from the political process (though, on the face of the document, from only the state
political process)." Id. at 97 (emphasis added).
166. H.R. REP. NO. 22, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1871), reprinted in A. AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENT DEBATES 466 (1967) (emphasis added). See note 159 supra.
167. Ely notes that there "were few citations of specific purpose that went beyond the coverage of the Civil
Rights Act." ELY, supra note I. at 30. The only ones known to me are the Bill of Rights remarks of Howard and
Bingham. Ely discreetly has chosen not to invoke Bingham, who said, "Mhe enforcement of the bill of
rights ... is one of the reserved powers of the States, to be enforced by State tribunals." CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866).
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Ely pitches his case on Senator Howard's reference to "'a mass of privi-
leges, immunities and rights, some of them secured by the second section of
the fourth article of the Constitution .... some by the first eight amend-
ments.""'s But this offers no support for Ely's reliance on the ninth amend-
ment to warrant interference in local matters, for Howard stopped short with
the first eight. Howard was mixing the immiscible and flying in the face of all
assurances that section 1, like the Civil Rights Act, was narrow in scope. Ely
cites Flack's statement that "no member of the Committee ... ques-
tioned ... [Howard's] statements in any particular, "' 69 but Ely himself
points out that not every one will "rise to correct every interpretation that
does not agree with his,"' 70 the less when that "interpretation" contradicts
numerous assurances that Act and amendment were "identical." Even so,
after Howard spoke, Senator Poland observed that the privileges or immuni-
ties clause "secures nothing beyond what was intended by the original [article
IV] provision," 7' a graceful correction. And Senator Doolittle remarked that
the Civil Rights Bill "was the forerunner of this constitutional amend-
ment." 72 Such reminders of known and limited objectives were intended to
reassure those whose consent had thus far been won to a narrow, not un-
limited, program.
Earlier, Ely concluded that
although neither the ratified language nor what is known of the intentions that
generated it fairly compels the conclusion that the provisions of the Bill of Rights
were to be counted among the privileges and immunities of citizens, there is at the
same time nothing in that language or those intentions that should preclude that
result, 173
adding that "the legislative history argument is one neither side can win."174
In that case Ely's argument collapses. First, given that the article IV "privi-
leges and immunities" did not comprehend the subsequent Bill of Rights, Ely
has the burden of proving that the framers intended to depart from that
meaning, under Chief Justice Marshall's requirement that "a principle never
168. ELY, supra note 1, at 26, quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2765-66 (1866) (emphasis
added).
169. Id. at 195 n.57.
170. Id. at 17. Ely taxes me with inconsistency in accepting "Justice Harlan's argument on voting rights but
reject[ing] Justice Black's similarly contoured argument on incorporation," apparently because both rely on
Senator Howard. Id. at 236 n.36. Howard's remarks that section 2 shows that suffrage was excluded from
section 1, see text accompanying notes 58-62 supra, reflected the widely shared view of the framers, expressed
on the face of section 2. And Howard himself categorically stated that suffrage was excluded. See note 58 supra.
But his reference to the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the privileges or immunities clause stood alone but fora
similar remark by Bingham, and it was contradicted by the history detailed above. For his statement that
Harlan's reference to the relations between sections I and 2 "seems shaky in light of the separate development
of the two sections," ELY, supra note 1, at 235 n.36, Ely relies on an article by Professor William Van Alstyne,
without taking account of the 42 pages I devoted to a refutation, once more betraying his habit of citing only
such materials as can be fitted into his theory, never mind the mass of historical data to the contrary.
171. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2961 (1866) (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 2896. See also text accompanying notes 119-22 supra.
173. Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 432 (1978).
174. Id. at 430. But compare text accompanying notes 147-50, 166 supra.
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before recognized should be expressed in plain specific terms."' 75 Second,
the reservation to the states by the tenth amendment of "powers not dele-
gated to the United States" is not to be curtailed by "inscrutable" words.
When the invasion of those reserved powers is of such magnitude as "in-
corporation" represents, it demands proof that such was the framers' inten-
tion.176 Senator Frederick Frelinghuysen, a framer who construed the four-
teenth amendment broadly, said in 1871 that the "amendment
must... not be used to make the General Government imperial. It must be
read ... together with the tenth amendment." 77 We need to recall Madison's
assurance in Federalist No. 39 that the federal "jurisdiction extends to certain
enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty over all other objects," and that in "controversies
relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions" the Court is to decide
"impartially ... according to the rules of the Constitution."' 78 Had the states
been advised that the Court would decide those boundary issues by resort to
values outside the Constitution, it is safe to say that the Constitution would
have been rejected. Such was the tenacious attachment of the people to their
states that they insisted on confining enforcement of the Constitution and
federal laws to state courts, with appeal to the Supreme Court. 7 9
And what has become of Ely's call for proof of endorsement by the
ratifiers? It is sheer cant to insist upon it with respect to the exclusion of
suffrage which undeniably reflected popular demand and drop it with respect
to the Bill of Rights where such sentiment was altogether lacking. Flack
gathered from the contemporary prints that the people considered that the
amendment "embodied" the Civil Rights Act, but found no published state-
ment that "the first eight amendments were to be made applicable to the
States. "'s 0 Fairman confirmed that but for the New York Herald and the New
York Times, no newspaper reported Howard's remarkable expansion of the
privileges or immunities clause, notwithstanding that incorporation of the Bill
of Rights would drastically reduce state self-rule, so dear to the men of
1866.81 And he added that Howard's remark "seems at the time to have sunk
without leaving a trace in public discussion." 8 2 Here, if anywhere, proof is
175. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
176. Justice Frankfurter asked Justice Black, "Is it conceivable that an amendment" establishing a "uni-
form system of judicial procedure" could "have been submitted" or "ratified." G. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 261 (1977).
177. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 501 (1871).
178. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 at 249 (J. Madison)(Mod. Lib. ed. 1937) (emphasis added).
179. R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 260-63 (1969).
180. H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 153 (1908).
181. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 68-69
(1949). On the other hand, Senator John Sherman, explaining the fourteenth amendment to the electorate in
Cincinnati, said: "The first section was an embodiment of the Civil Rights Bill, namely: that every body...
should have the right to go from county to county, and from State to State, to make contracts, to sue and be
sued, to contract and be contracted with; that is the sum and substance of the first clause." Id. at 77.
182. Id. at 69.
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called for that the ratifiers considered they were surrendering cherished self-
rule.
Proof beyond cavil that the framers did not consider that the fourteenth
amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights is furnished by an amendment
proposed by James Blaine in 1875, in a Congress that included twenty-three
members of the thirty-ninth Congress, among them Blaine. Prior thereto he
had written a letter published by the New York Times indicating that the
fourteenth amendment did not prohibit states from establishing official
churches or maintaining sectarian schools. Consequently he proposed that
"[n]o state shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof":
Not one of the several Representatives and Senators who spoke on the proposal
even suggested that its provisions were implicit in the amendment ratified just
seven years earlier .... Remarks of Randolph, Christiancy, Kernan, Whyte,
Bogy, Eaton and Morton give confirmation to the belief that none of the legislators
in 1875 thought the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the religious provisions
of the First.183
Only an invincible addiction to his theory can explain Ely's unwillingness to
bow to such facts.
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND ELY'S "INVITATION"
Considering the centrality of the equal protection clause for his theory,
Ely's discussion is surprisingly skimpy-two pages, plus one and one-third
pages on the Court's incorporation of equal protection in the fifth amendment,
which he labels "gibberish.' ' 84 His two pages contain no historical data;
instead he opines that "the content of the Equal Protection Clause ... will
not be found anywhere in its terms or in the ruminations of its writers," 185 that
like the "inscrutable" privileges or immunities clause, the equal protection
clause "is also unforthcoming with details." 8 6 So he resorts to generalities.
Why, he asks, "should Justice Harlan get hung up on the specific intentions of
the framers," when, "[a]s we have seen [?], the overriding intention of those
who wrote and ratified the Equal Protection Clause was apparently to state a
general ideal whose specific applications would be supplied by posterity."'87
As Mark Tushnet observes, Ely's "equal protection theory.., involves
arbitrariness at the stage of definition. "' 88 Given "inscrutable" language, that
183. F. O'BRIEN. JUSTICE REED AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 116 (1958).
184. ELY, supra note I. at 30-33.
185. Id. at 32.
186. Id. at 98.
187. Id. at 119. Professor C. Vann Woodward, dean of Reconstruction historians, wrote, "One is driven by
the evidence" to conclude that "popular convictions were not prepared to sustain" a "guarantee of equality."
C. WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 83 (1960).
188. Tushnet, Darkness at the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory,
89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1053 (1980).
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is precisely the occasion for resort to "specific intentions. "'89 That "specific
intention" was to bar suffrage, and no "general" words can overcome that
intention. Consequently Ely's statement that "[u]njustified discriminations in
the distribution of the franchise fit comfortably within the language of-and
just as obviously violate the ideal expressed by-the Equal Protection
Clause,"'90 flies in the face of the record. Despite the deeply rooted racism
earlier noted, again evidenced by what Ely describes as "white resistance,
often literally murderous, to the enforcement of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment,"' 9' he understands the "Fourteenth Amendment to have been centrally
concerned with eradicating" "racially prejudiced thinking."' 92 And in the
teeth of incontrovertible evidence that the framers excluded suffrage from
the fourteenth amendment, a view acknowledged by more and more activists,
Ely "comfortably" concludes that the history is "inconclusive.' 93
A few facts will suffice to show how far his theorizing is removed from
fact. Time and again sweeping proposals to abolish all discriminations were
rejected. 94 At the outset, 'Stevens, the Radical leader, submitted to the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction a proposal that "[a ll laws, state or national,
shall operate impartially and equally on all persons ..... But in summing up
in favor of the fourteenth amendment, he sadly confessed that while he had
hoped to remodel "all our institutions as to have freed them from every
vestige of ... inequality of rights .... that no distinction would be toler-
ated. . . , this bright dream has vanished." 95 The Committee chairman,
Senator William Fessenden, explained that "[wie cannot put into the Consti-
tution, owing to existing prejudices and existing institutions, an entire exclu-
sion of all class distinctions." ' Bearing in mind that the framers' exclusion
of suffrage undermines Ely's "political access" theory, consider his failure to
account for a "fatal" fact. In an early version of the amendment, provision
was made for both "the same political rights and privileges and.., equal
189. In the 39th Congress. Charles Sumner said that ifthe meaning of the Constitution "in any place is open
to doubt, or if words are used which seem to have no fixed signification, we cannot err if we turn to the
framers." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 677 (1866).
190. ELY, supra note 1, at 119. His fellow activist, Paul Brest, comments that the"adoptors of the equal
protection clause probably intended it not to encompass voting discrimination at all." Brest, The Misconceived
Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 234 n. 115 (1980). See also Gunther, Some Reflec-
tions on the Judicial Role: Distinctions, Roots and Prospects, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 817, 825, quoted in note 71
supra..
191. ELY, supra note 1. at 257 n.94.
192. Id. at 243 n.ll. But see note 187 supra.
193. ELY, supra note 1, at 119. On the other hand, activist Professor Lusky considers that Justice Harlan's
demonstration to the contrary is "irrefutable and unrefuted." Lusky, Book Review, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
403, 406 (1979). For similar activist views, see authorities cited in note 8 supra.
194. R. BERGER. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 163-64 (1977).
195. B. KENDRICK. THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITrEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 46
(1914); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.. Ist Sess. 3148 (1866) (emphasis added).
196. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 705 (1866). In discussing the fourteenth amendment, for which
he voted, Senator James Patterson said he was opposed to laws discriminating against blacks "in the security
and protection of life, liberty, person. property.... Beyond this I am not prepared to go." Id. at 2699. See also
R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 29 n.30 (1977).
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protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property," 97 testimony that
"equal protection" did not comprehend "political rights and privileges," but
was confined to "life, liberty, and property." When "political rights and
privileges" was elided, leaving "equal protection" alone, the latter patently
did not include the deleted "political privileges." Ely's omission to comment
on this deletion is telling.
Throughout the debates on the Civil Rights Bill, which, it will be recalled,
secured only the "equal benefit of all laws for security of person and prop-
erty," the framers interchangeably referred to "equality," "equality before
the law," and "equal protection," but always in the circumscribed context of
the rights enumerated in the bill.' 98 So, Samuel Shellabarger said, "whatever
rights as to each of these enumerated civil (not political) matters the States
may confer upon one race ... shall be held by all races in equality .... It
secures ... equality of protection in those enumerated civil 'ights."'99 Under
the pari materia rule, this meaning is to be given words in the "identical"
amendment. 200 This was the "content" the words had for the framers, and it
renders idle Ely's speculations as to the meaning of the "inscrutable" terms.
Evidence is not defeated by speculation.20'
In truth Ely prefers to build on Professor Ronald Dworkin's philosophical
construct: "'equal concern and respect in the design and administration of the
political institutions.' The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
197. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31 (1955).
"Early drafts of the Fourteenth Amendment employed language sufficiently broad to bar racial discrimination
with respect to political rights; but the ultimate decision to protect interests in life, liberty, and property' seems
to have reflected hesitation over widespread extension of political rights to Negroes." E. BARRETT. P. BURTON
& J. HONNOLD, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 804 (2d ed. 1963).
198. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 169-70 (1977).
199. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1293 (1866) (emphasis added). Leonard Myers of Pennsylvania
stated that the change "from slavery to freedom" requires that "each State shall provide for equality before the
law, equal protection to life, liberty and property, equal rights to sue and be sued, to inherit, make contracts.
and give testimony"-the very rights enumerated in the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 1622. See R. BERGER, GOVERN-
MENT BY JUDICIARY 169-72 (1977).
Bickel, "the preeminent noninterpretivist theorist of our age," ELY, supra note I, at 186 n. 11, concluded
that the moderate leadership (which prevailed) had in mind a "limited and well-defined meaning .... a right to
equal protection in the literal sense of benefiting equally from the laws for the security of person and property."
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 56 (1%2), the narrow subject matter of the Act. See quote of
Senator Sherman in note 181 supra. Bingham, draftsman of the fourteenth amendment, explained that it
"confers upon Congress power to see to it that the protection given by the laws of the States shall be equal in
respect to life and liberty and property to all persons .... The words 'equal protection' contain it, and nothing
else." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1094 (1866) (emphasis added).
Life, liberty and property, Blackstone explained, meant personal security, freedom of locomotion, and the
right to own property. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 129, 134, 138 (1765).
Samuel Adams and James Otis considered that "the primary, absolute, natural rights of Englishmen ... are
Personal Security, Personal Liberty, and Private Property." I S. ADAMS, WRITINGS 65 (1904). Blackstone, and
Chancellor James Kent to the same effect, were read to the framers by James Wilson and William Lawrence,
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1118, 1832-33 (1866), and were summarized by Senator Trumbull as the
"great fundamental rights set forth in this bill." See text accompanying note 145 supra.
200. See text accompanying notes 125 and 147 snpra. Chief Justice Taney said "[the members of the
Convention unquestionably used the words they inserted in the Constitution in the same sense in which they
used them in their debates." The Passenger Cases, 92 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 478 (1849)(dissenting).
201. For citations, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 74 n.15 (1977).
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is obviously our Constitution's most dramatic embodiment of this ideal.- 20 2
Gary Leedes observes that Ely "adopts it as a centerpiece for his process-
oriented apologia for Warren Court activism .... Yet Ely dismisses the
notion that judges may "seek constitutional values in-that is, overrule politi-
cal officials on the basis of-the writings of good contemporary moral phil-
osophers .... " particularly since they "reach very different conclu-
sions." 20 And he considers that the case that our "judiciary has done a better
job of speaking for our better moral selves turns out to be historically
shaky., 20 5 Such are the grounds from which Ely distills a "rather sweeping
mandate to judge of the validity of governmental choices.-'°26
Republican Form of Government
Ely turns to the "republican form of government" guarantee because
"the right to vote in state elections ... cannot be teased out of the language
of equal protection alone and in textual terms is most naturally assignable to
the Republican Form Clause., 20 7 Thus, "to be intelligible, Reynolds v.
Sims. .. must be approached as the joint product of the Equal Protection
and Republican Form Clauses." 203 But Ely's view runs counter to that of
the Court, whose powers he would expand; as Dean Carl Auerbach noted, it
"agreed in Baker v. Carr that 'any reliance' on the Guarantee clause in ap-
portionment controversies would be futile."-209 Here, as with the privileges or
immunities clause, Ely must first resurrect a clause that "has so long lain
fallow. 2' 0 Aware that in Luther v. Borden211 the Court held that it is for
Congress, not the Court, to determine whether a state enjoys a republican
form of government, he considers that this "unfortunate doctrine," now 130
years old, "will wholly pass from the scene one of these days," 2 2 and there-
202. ELY. supra note I. at 82. Professor Michael Perry observes that Dworkin's constitutional juris-
prudence proceeds from the assumption that "'because the fourteenth amendment (and much else in the Con-
stitution) is intentionally open-ended, the Court, functioning ideally as a sophisticated moral philosopher, must
define the amendment's precise content," and remarks that "Berger's refutation of the notion that the four-
teenth amendment was 'intentionally incomplete . . .' seriously impinges on Ronald Dworkin's constitutional
jurisprudence." Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 685. 6% n.38 (1978).
203. Leedes. The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEX. L. REV 1361, 1365 n.15 (1979). Leedes comments that both
Dworkin and Ely "construct from the equal concern and respect norm a model of rights that supposedly
removes the more pernicious aspects of judicial discretion" but considers that "each of their models in-
creases . . . opportunities for the exercise ofjudicial discretion, and thus for the invasion of areas reserved for
the political branches of government." Id. at 1378 n.105.
204. ELY. stpra note I. at 58.
205, Id. at 57. Ely notes that on critical occasions, e.g., the imprisonment of Eugene Debs in 1919, the later
communist witch hunt (or the Japanese relocation case), the Court, as Judge Learned Hand remarked, has not
been "wholly immune from the 'herd instinct."' Id. at 107 n.*, 108, 112.
206, Id. at 32.
207. Id. at 118 n.*.
208, Id. at 122.
209. Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person-One Vote-One Vote-One Value, 1964 S. Cr.
REV. I. 85, citing 369 U.S. 186, 227 (1962).
210. ELY, supra note 1. at 241 n.78.
211, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
212, ELY, supra note I, at 118 n.*.
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fore examines the issue in historical terms. Unhappily, his appeal to history is
once more faulty.
Preliminarily, Ely asserts that "while it is true that many among the
framers indicated their understanding that ... [republican form] connoted
what we would now call a representative democracy, for others it appears to
have required only that the government not be a monarchy.- 21 3 The two were
not antithetical but complementary. In his discussion of "representative
democracy" Ely quotes from Federalist No. 39, that to a republican govern-
ment it is "essential ... that it be derived from the great body of society, not
from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class [e.g., "a handful of
tyrannical nobles"]., 21 4 And Hamilton added: "It is sufficient for such a
government that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or in-
directly, by the people . ... ,,2" This was the form that was guaranteed by
the republican form clause. The guarantee "supposes," said Madison, "a
preexisting government of the form which is to be guaranteed. As long, there-
fore, as the existing republican forms are continued by the States they are
guaranteed by the Constitution." 216 No state, Edmund Randolph said, "ought
to have it in their power to change its government into a monarchy.,
' 7
Madison summarized in Federalist No. 43: "[T]he superintending govern-
ment ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristo-
cratic or monarchical innovations .... [The members of the Union] have the
right to insist that the forms of government under which the compact was
entered should be substantially maintained.- 21 8 James Iredell observed that
"consistently with this [anti-monarchical] restriction, the states may make
what change in their own governments they think proper, ' 21 9 manifestly as-
suring against interference with local control of suffrage. Although Federalist
No. 52 stated that the "definition of the right of suffrage is very justly re-
garded as a fundamental act of republican government," it concluded that the
right must be left to the states because "the different qualifications in the
different States [could not be reduced] to one uniform rule. ' ' 220 And alluding
to the allocation of representatives according to the number of inhabitants,
No. 54 added, "the right of choosing their allotted number in each State is to
be exercised by such part of the inhabitants as the State itself may desig-
nate .... In every State, a certain proportion of inhabitants are deprived of
this right by the Constitution of the State.",
221
213. Id. at 122-23.
214. Id. at 6, quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 at 244 (J. Madison)4Mod. Lib. ed. 1937)(emphasis in
original).
215. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 at 244 (J. Madison)(Mod. Lib. ed. 1937)emphasis in original).
216. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 at 283 (J. Madison)(Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
217. I M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 206 (1911).
218. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 at 283 (J. Madison)(Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
219. 4 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OFTHE FEDER-
AL CONSTITUTION 195 (1836).
220. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 at 341-42 (J. Madison)(Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
221. THE FEDERALIST NO. 54 at 356 (J. Madison)(Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). In the Convention, Oliver Ells-
worth stated, -'[T]he right of suffrage was a tender point, and strongly guarded by most of the [State] Constitu-
tions .... The States are the best judges .... " 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
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Consequently, Ely is constrained to argue that there is nothing "special
about the Republican Form Clause that suggests that a line of growth or
development (like that the Court has given virtually every other constitutional
phrase) would be inappropriate."- 2 Thereby he scuttles all pretense of root-
ing his theory in the Constitution and asks the Court to seek for values outside
the Constitution,2 as it has so frequently done in the recent past. And it is
circular reasoning to support new activist forays by the Court's own expan-
sionist opinions in other fields.-- Nor does it advance his cause to cite Charles
Sumner for the "propriety of a line of growth, "2  for he was crushingly
rejected by his compeers in the Thirty-ninth Congress. When Sumner argued
that the guarantee clause places Congress under a duty to "see that every man
votes who ought to vote," Senator Fessenden replied, "he goes considerably
further than those who made the Constitution intended to go.",226 If a state,
Fessenden said, "should choose to have a monarchy, or the controlling por-
tion of the people choose to have an oligarchy, it then becomes the duty of
Congress to interfere.-227 Meeting a query whether a state "should cease to
be republican" if it excluded a race from the franchise, Conkling responded
that this "has always been permitted with universal acquiescence by the
courts and the nation."22  Bingham, regarded as the conduit of abolitionist
theology, said in July 1866 respecting the admission of Tennessee without
provision for Negro enfranchisement, that if this was in violation of the
guarantee, Tennessee was in the company of many northern states. His op-
ponents were defeated by a vote of 125 to 12.29 In the Senate, Trumbull
stated, "[m]ost of us are here under republican forms of government, just like
this in Tennessee." 20 Thus, Sumner's "line of growth" was rejected by the
CONVENTION OF 1787 201 (191 i). In his 1791 Philadelphia Lectures, Justice James Wilson noted the great
disparity among the States respecting the qualifications of electors, and that article I, § 2 "intrusts
to. . . the several states, the very important power of ascertaining the qualifications of electors." IJ. WILSON,
WORKS 409. 411 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967). See also note 316 infra.
Madison wrote. "'It would be happy if a state of society could be found or framed in which an equal voice in
making the laws might be allowed to every individual bound to obey them. But this is a theory which, like most
theories, confessedly requires limitations and modifications." Quoted in A. AVINS. THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENT DEBATES 146 (1967).
222. ELY. supra note I. at 123.
223. Yet Ely urges that "a government is not 'republican* unless the important policy issues are decided by
elected officials." Id. at 240 n.78. "Much as liberals may not like it," Ely says, "one reason we have broadly
based representative assemblies is to await something approaching a consensus before government intervenes."
1. at 133-34.
224. Consider judicial expansionism in light of Ely's "distrust of the self-serving motives of those in
power." Id. at 136 n.*.
225. Id. at 238 n.57.
226. CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 706 (1866).
227. Id. Sumner's biographer, David Donald. comments that his program "was not taken seriously" and
that his Republican colleagues greeted his resolution and bills with "total silence.'" 2 D. DONALD, CHARLES
SUMNER AND THE COMING OFTHE CIVIL WAR 234. 235. 240, 243 (1960). In fact he was "detest[ed]." Id. at
2-6. See also R. BERGER. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 236 (1977); Berger. The Fourteenth Amendment:
Light From the Fifteenth. 74 NW. UJ.L. REV. 311, 328-29 (1979).
228. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 358-59 (1866).
229. Id. at 3978-80.
230. Id. at 3988.
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framers. True, a very few Radical dissentients favored his view, but it has
been a cardinal vice of activist theoreticians to rely on such opposition state-
ments although the courts dismiss them as evidence of legislative intention.2"
Given Ely's concession that "the right to vote in state elections.., cannot
be teased out of' the equal protection clause but must be yoked with the
republican form clause, his "political access" theory is without support in
either, and they stand no better in combination.
The Ninth Amendment
Ely realizes that in invoking the ninth amendment he faces an uphill task:
"In sophisticated legal circles mentioning the Ninth Amendment is a sure fire
way to get a laugh., 232 Nevertheless, after stamping Chief Justice Warren's
holding in Boiling v. Sharpe that "the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment incorporates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment" as "gibberish both syntactically and historically,"' 3 Ely turns
to the ninth, asserting that "such an open-ended provision is appropriately
read to include an 'equal protection' component. ' 23 4 "In fact," he considers
"the conclusion that the Ninth Amendment was intended to signal the exist-
ence of federal constitutional rights beyond those specifically enumerated in
the Constitution is the only conclusion its language seems comfortably able to
support.
235
Ely does not, however, plainly confine his invocation of the ninth amend-
ment to the federal domain. We are agreed that "[i]t is quite clear that the
original framers and ratifying conventions intended the Bill of Rights to con-
trol only the actions of the federal government,",216 and it therefore bears
emphasis that his "federal constitutional rights" can be asserted only against
the federal government, not the states, unless Ely relies on incorporation in
the fourteenth amendment, which he does not cite at this point. His reference
to the "existence of federal constitutional rights" requires explication. Both
the rights expressed in the Bill of Rights and the unspecified rights retained by
the people "exist," but only the former are "constitutional rights." For a
right "retained" by the people and not described has not been embodied in
the Constitution. Madison made clear that the retained rights were not "as-
signed" to the federal government, 27 for enforcement or otherwise; to the
contrary, he emphasized that they constitute an area in which the "[glovern-
231. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 157-65 (1977). For decisions, see id. at 160.
232. ELY, supra note I, at 34. For a detailed discussion, see Berger, The Ninth Amnendmnent.66 CORNELL
L. REV. I (1980).
233. ELY, supra note I, at 32.
234. Id. at 33. But compare note 146 infra (statement by Madison), and note 260 infra (statement by King).
235. Id. at 38.
236. Id. at 37. As Justice Miller stated, "'The adoption of the first eleven amendments ... so soon after the
original instrument was accepted, shows a prevailing sense of danger at that time from the Federal power."
Slaughter House Cases. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 82 (1872).




ment ought not to act."238 This means, in my judgment, that the courts have
not been empowered to enforce the retained rights against either the federal
government or the states.
Ely himself observes: "[Olne thing we know to a certainty from the
historical context is that the Ninth Amendment was not designed to grant
Congress authority to create additional rights, to amend Article I, Section 8
by adding a general power to protect rights."239 Without protection a right is
empty. And he justly points out that the phrase "'others retained by the
people [is not] an apt way of saying others Congress may create."' 240 That
power of creating equally was withheld from the courts; the founders did not
regard the courts as "creators" (i.e. lawmakers), but as discoverers of exist-
ing law. 241 For them the separation of powers, as Madison said in the first
Congress, was a "sacred principle." 242 To this they added a "profound fear"
of judicial discretion.24 3 It does not therefore advance the case for judicial
enforcement that "'[t]here was at the time of the original Constitution little
legislative history indicating that any particular provision was to receive judi-
cial enforcement: the Ninth Amendment was not singled out one way or
another.''244 For all the presuppositions the founders brought to the task
militate against a blank check to that department, which Hamilton assured
them "was next to nothing. 245 Ely himself remarks that "read for what it
says the Ninth Amendment seems open-textured enough to support almost
anything one might wish to argue, and that thought can get pretty scary." 246
238. See text accompanying note 251 itfra. A bill of rights was omitted from the Constitution, Hamilton
explained in FEDERALIST NO. 84 at 559 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937), because "'a minute detail of particular rights" was
better suited to a (State) 'constitution which has the regulation of every species of personal and private
concerns" than to the proposed federal Constitution "'which is merely intended to regulate the general political
interests of the nation."
239. ELY, supra note I. at 37 (emphasis added).
240. Id.
241. "Judges conceived their role as merely that of discovering and applying existing legal rules." Horwitz,
The Emergence of an Instrtutental Conception ofAtierican Law 1780-1820. in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY 287. 2% (1971).
242, I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 581 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1836) (print bearing running title "History of
Congress").
243. G. WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 298 (1969). in 1796 Chief Justice
Hutchinson of Massachusetts declared. "[Tihe Judge should never be the Legislator: Because then the Will of
the Judge would be the Law: and this tends to a State of Slavery." Quoted in Horwitz, The Emergence of an
Instrumental Conception of American Law 1780-1820, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
287. 292 (1971).
244. ELY. supra note I. at 40 (emphasis added).
245. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 at 504 (A. Hamilton)(Mod. Lib. ed. 1937) (emphasis added). In his 1791
Philadelphia Lectures. Justice James Wilson, a leading architect of the Constitution, explained, "'iTjhe execu-
tive and judicial power [prior to the revolution] ... were derived from ... a foreign source ... [and) were
directed to foreign purposes. Need we be surprised, that they were objects of aversion and distrust? Need we be
surprised, that every occasion was seized for lessening their influence? ... On the other hand, our assemblies
were chosen by ourselves: they were the guardians of our rights, the objects of our confidence, and the anchors
of our political hopes.... Even at this time [17911, people can scarcely devest themselves of those opposite
prepossessions. But it is high time we should chastise our prejudices ..... I J. WILSON, WORKS 292-93 (R.
McCloskey ed. 1967).
246. ELY, supra note I, at 34. In 1830 Madison wrote, "[It] exceeds the possibility of belief, that the known
advocates in the Convention for a jealous grant and certain definition of federal powers, should have silently
permitted the introduction of words or phrases in a sense rendering fruitless the restrictions and definitions
elaborated by them." 3 M. FARRAND. RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 488 (1911). What
can better illustrate the dream world in which activists fashion "open-ended" phraseology?
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That thought, I venture, would have scared the founders out of their wits.
And it runs against Madison's explanation that the Bill of Rights would impel
the judiciary "to resist encroachments upon rights expressly stipulated
for ... by the declaration of rights," 247 reinforcing the conclusion that courts
were not empowered to enforce the retained and undescribed rights.
Ely finds Madison's explanation of the ninth amendment separating the
question of "unenumerated powers" from the question of "unenumerated
rights" confusing-"the possibility that unenumerated rights will be dispar-
aged is seemingly made to do service as an intermediate premise in an argu-
ment that unenumerated powers will be implied .... ." This "confusion" he
attributes to "what we today would regard as a category mistake, a failure to
recognize that rights and powers are not simply the absence of one another
but that rights can cut across or 'trump' powers." 248 Whether the founders
were mistaken in logic is of no moment if they acted on that mistaken view. 49
That the framers premised that rights and powers were two sides of the same
coin is hardly disputable. The exceptions "in favor of particular rights,"
Madison stated, were to be regarded as "actual limitations on such pow-
ers." 0 The "great object" of a Bill of Rights, he said, was to "limit and
qualify the powers of Government, by excepting out of the grant of power
those cases in which the Government ought not to act, or to act only in a
particular mode."'25 As Ely observes, "[wihat is important" is that Madison
"wished to forestall both the implication of unexpressed powers and the dis-
paragement of unenumerated rights," employing the tenth amendment for the
one and the ninth for the other. 2 By what logic do we derive "unexpressed
powers" to enforce "unenumerated rights" in the teeth of Madison's purpose
247. I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 440 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1836) (print bearing running title "History of
Congress").
248. ELY. supra note 1. at 36. Citing Hamilton's reply in THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 at 560 (A. Hamilton)
(Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). to the argument that the power of taxation could be used to inhibit freedom of expression.
Ely concludes that "the possibility of a governmental act's being supported by one of the enumerated
powers and at the same time violating one of the enumerated rights is one our forebears were capable of
contemplating." Id. at 202 n.86. Hamilton rejected the notion that "the imposition of duties upon publication"
would be impeded by express declarations in "State Constitutions in fayor of freedom of the press." relying on
the British practice of taxing newspapers. In other words, exercise of the taxing power historically did not
violate freedom of the press.
Whether an enumnerated power might override an "exception" in favor of an enntnerated right need not
presently detain us, though it is worth noting Madison's emphasis that enumerated rights were "excepted" "out
of the grant of power," that they were to be regarded as actual limitations of such powers." I ANNALS OF
CONGRESS 435, 437 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1836) (print bearing running title "History of Congress"). Here the
issue is whether there is an "unexpressed power" to enforce unenutmerated rights retained by the people."
249. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 186 (1928).
250. I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 435 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1836) (print bearing running title "History of
Congress") (emphasis added).
25 I. Id. at 437 (emphasis added). Leslie Dunbar observed that Madison seems to have thought of rights
under two main headings. One, as stipulating agreed upon methods by which in particular cases the government
shall exercise powers. Secondly, he thought of another class of rights as declarations of areas totally outside the
province of government. Madison's intention was "to define those fields into which powi'ers do nt extend at
all.*" Dunbar. James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42 VA. L. REV. 627, 635-36 (1956)(emphasis added).
C. C. Pinckney told the South Carolina House of Representatives that "by delegating express powers. %e
certainly reserve to ourselves every power and right not mentioned." 3 M. FARRAND. RECORDS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 256 (1911).
252. ELY, supra note 1. at 36.
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to "forestall ... the implication of unexpressed powers," his emphasis that
the enumeration of "particular rights" was not to be construed to "enlarge
the powers delegated by the Constitution" but rather "as actual limitations of
such powers"?23 Is it conceivable that Madison meant to confer "open-
ended" power by retaining "unenumerated rights" while limiting power by
the enumeration of "particular rights"? Such a conclusion also collides with
Ely's affirmation that the ninth amendment was not designed to add to article
I, section 8 "a general power to protect rights."
Finally, Ely concludes that "[i]f a principled approach to judicial enforce-
ment [of open-ended provisions] cannot be developed, one that is not hope-
lessly inconsistent with our nation's commitment to representative democ-
racy, responsible commentators must consider seriously the possibility that
courts simply should stay away from them."-24 The notion that the framers,
so fearful of the greedy expansiveness of power,25 would make an "open-
ended," i.e., unlimited, grant, which after the lapse of 200 years is so "scary"
that Ely would condemn it unless limited by a "principled" approach, verges
on the "incredible."- 256 And it is little less strange to assume that a Court
which employed the allegedly "open-ended" terms of the fourteenth amend-
ment,27 despite the framers' unmistakable intention to exclude suffrage from
its scope, will defer to the self-denying "principles" that Ely now proffers.
2-;3. I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 433 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1836) (print bearing running title "History of
Congress").
54. ELY, supra note I. at 41.
255. The colonists feared the "endlessly propulsive tendency" of power "to expand itself beyond legiti-
mate boundaries." B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 56-57 (1%7).
256. The pejorative is borrowed from Ely's description of my views. ELY, supra note I, at 200 n.66.
257. For critique of this theory, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 300-11 (1977). Ely has it
that the framers of the fourteenth amendment issued an "open and across-the-board invitation to import into the
constitutional decision process considerations that will not be found in the amendment nor even... elsewhere
in the Constitution." Ely. Constitutional Interpretivisin: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 415
(1978) (emphasis added). For the untenability of this view, see Berger, Government by Judiciary: John Hart
Ely's "Initation," 54 IND. L.J. 277 (1979).
The claim that the 1789 framers issued such an "invitation" through the medium of "open-ended" terms
runs counter to Ely's own analysis. He remarks that the founders "certainly didn't have natural law in mind
when the Constitution's various open-ended delegations to the future, were inserted and approved ... ,. ELY,
supra, note I. at 39; and he notes that "you can invoke natural law to support anything you want." Id. at 50. His
"open-ended" theory would permit judges to impose personal, extra-constitutional values that admittedly
found no favor in the shape of natural law. See also note 246 supra (statement of Madison), and note 260 infra
(statements of Adams and King).
The founders, as Professor Philip Kurland observed, and as is well attested, were attached to a limited
Constitution. one of "fixed and unchanging meaning," except as changed by amendment. P. KIRLAND,
WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1978). They conceived the judges' role as policing constitutional
boundaries, not as taking over legislative functions within those boundaries, much less as revising the Constitu-
tion. For citations, see Berger. Government by Judiciary: John Hart Ely's "Invitation," 54 IND. L.J. 277, 287
(1979). As Elbridge Gerry stated. "' It was quite foreign from the nature of the office to make them judges of the
policy of public measures."' For citations to Gerry and corroborative materials, see id.
Such were the presuppositions that underlie Madison's reference to protection of "stipulated rights." Ely's
acknowledgement that the ninth amendment did not empower Congress to "create" additional rights, or add "a
general power to protect rights." is at war with his view that the Amendment is open-ended.
It remains to be said that Professor Gerald Gunther stated, "I certainly haven't seen any case made as to
the meaning of the Ninth Amendment"; and Professor Jesse Choper observed, "I just don't think it adds
anything to other clauses of the Constitution." Forum, Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 645, 679 (1975).
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The "Open-Ended" Theory
Although Ely is affrighted by his "open-ended" theory, it is the mainstay
of his reliance on the ninth and fourteenth amendments as an "invitation" to
look beyond the four comers of the Constitution, the "interpretivist's
Bible. ' ' 8 Apparently the Constitution is not really his Bible, but merely
window dressing for his activist aims. Those of us who have an abiding
commitment to the Constitution do not cherish it because it was handed down
from on high but because as true democrats we respect the will of the people
in Convention assembled, who forged our nation and spelled out the limits of
the powers they delegated. Historical fact is notably absent from Ely's theo-
rizing; for him the words themselves suffice to reveal that they are "open-
textured." 259 But Samuel Adams, the archetypal founder, stated: "Vague
uncertain laws, and more especially Constitutions, are the very instruments of
slavery.' 260 Such men would not resort to words of "uncertain" and "scary"
content to disguise their purposes.
Activists generally approach the role of the Supreme Court as if they
were distributing constitutional power, rarely pausing to ask: what powers did
the framers allocate to the judiciary? Ely remarks: "Judicial review was not
even a clearly contemplated feature of the original Constitution (though it is
certainly a bona fide feature of today's).- 2 61 If, however, the power was not
originally granted, how did it find its way into the Constitution? And given a
dubious grant, judicial revision of the Constitution or displacement of legisla-
tive policy choices is the grossest usurpation, particularly because, as Ely
notices, "[R]ule by an aristocracy, even in modem dress, is not what Ameri-
cans have ever wanted., 262 In truth, the founders had a "profound fear" of
judicial discretion; 26 Chief Justice Hutchinson of Massachusetts declared that
it tended to a "state of slavery." In their eyes judges were not makers of law,
but discoverers of existing law, so that judicial innovation was "impermissi-
ble." 264 In a landmark case laying claim to judicial review, Judge Henry of the
Virginia court stated:
The judiciary, from the nature of the office. . . ,could never be designed to de-
termine upon the equity, necessity, or usefulness of law; that would amount to an
258. ELY, supra note I, at 13.
259. Id. at 34.
260. S. ADAMS, WRITINGS 262 (1904). See also note 89 supra. Rufus King stated in the Massachusetts
Ratification Convention that the Philadelphia Convention desired -to use those expressions that were most easy
to be understood and least equivocal in their meaning .... We believe that the powers are closely defined, the
expressions are as free from ambiguity as the Convention could form them." 3 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OFTHE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 268 (1911). See also the remarks of Caleb Strong, id. at 248. And see also note
246 supra (remarks of Madison).
261. ELY, supra note I at 225 n.47.
262. Ely, Constitutional Interpretivisnt: Its Allure and Impossibilirv, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 411 (1978).
263. See note 241 supra. Ely remarks: "Proceeding on the basis of general rule rather than ad hoc determi-
nation also reduces the discretion of the decision-maker and thus helps to protect individuals and minority
groups from invidious discrimination." ELY, supra note I, at 155 n.*.
264. Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of Auerican Law 1780-1820, in 5 PERSPEC-
TIVES IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 287, 296-98 (1971).
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express interfering with the legislative branch .... [N]ot being chosen immedi-
ately by the people, nor being accountable to them..., they do not, and ought
not, to represent the people in framing or repealing any law.
265
Henry reflected Montesquieu, the oracle of the founders: "The national
judges are no more than the mouth that pronounces the words of the law,
mere passive beings, incapable of moderating either its force or its rigor."-266
Judicial review was alien to English law-Parliament was supreme. 267 A few
post-1776 state cases of which the Convention was aware sought to enforce
constitutional limitations and aroused resentment leading to efforts to remove
the offending judges.2 68 Responding to the views of Gerry and others that
judges were not especially qualified to judge of policy, the framers excluded
them from participation in the presidential veto, that is, in the legislative
process.269 Little wonder that Hamilton, the great proponent of judicial re-
view, assured the ratifiers that of the three departments, the judiciary "is next
to nothing" ;270 and he left no doubt that judicial power did not comprehend
law-making or encroachment on the legislature.27' Still less were judges con-
sidered constitution makers or revisers-that was left to the people by amend-
ment under article V. It is therefore sheer fantasy to maintain that the
founders employed "open-ended" terms in order to empower judges to over-
rule the legislature or rewrite the Constitution by invoking values derived
outside the Constitution. Gary Leedes justly observes that Ely's theory
tinkers "with the Constitution's allocation of powers." 272
Ely's reiteration that the terms of the fourteenth amendment are "open-
ended" is depressing, because he shuts his eyes to the proof to the contrary
that was spread before him.273 The "open-ended" theory was launched by
Bickel as a tentative hypothesis: "what if any thought was given to the long
range effect of the amendment in the future?" Could resort to the equal
protection clause "have failed to leave the implication that the new
265. Kamper v. Hawkins. 3 Va. (I Va. Cas.) 20, 47 (1793). An ardent activist. Professor Charles Black,
observed that for the colonists "the function of the judge was thus placed in sharpest antithesis to that of the
legislator." who alone was concerned "with what the law ought to be." C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE
COURT 160 (1960).
266. C. MONTESQUIEU. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 130 (J. Prichard ed. 1878).
267. I W. BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 91 (1765).
268. R. BERGER. CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 36-46 (1969).
269. Berger. "'The Supreme Court as a Legislature": a Dissent, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 988 (1979).
270. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 at 504 (A. Hamilton)(Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). See also note 245 supra.
271. There "is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers." THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 at 504 (A. Hamilton)(Mod. Lib. ed. 1937); the courts may not "on the
pretense of a repugnancy ... substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature,"
Id. at 507. "To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by
strict rules and precedents .... - Id. at 5 10. And Hamilton assured the ratifiers that judges could be impeached
for "'deliberate usurpations of the authority of the legislature." Id., NO. 81 at 526-27 (A. Hamilton).
272. Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1361, 1435 (1979).
273. Berger, Government by Judiciary: John Hart Ely's "Invitation," 54 IND. L.J. 277, 304-06 (1979). See
R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 99-116 (1977). Perry, an activist much cited by Ely, wrote,
"Berger's historical inquiry has, in my view, devastated the notion that the framers of the fourteenth amend-
ment ... intended it to be 'open-ended."' Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 695 (1978). See also
id. at 691.
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phrase ... was more receptive to the 'latitudinarian' construction? No one
made the point with regard to this particular clause., 274 Given that the intro-
ductory clause of the Bill was deleted in order to obviate a "latitudinarian"
construction, that the framers stressed "equal protection" for the rights
enumerated in the Civil Rights Act, that under the pari materia rule that
meaning is to be given to "equal protection," particularly because Act and
amendment were considered "identical," 275 it stands customary analysis on
its head to presume that "equal protection" was chosen because it was
"receptive to the 'latitudinarian' construction," i.e. "inscrutable."
"It remains true," Bickel continued, "that an explicit provision going
further than the Civil Rights Act would not have carried in the 39th Con-
gress," that the Republicans drew back from a "formulation dangerously
vulnerable to attacks pandering to the prejudice of the people," and therefore,
he speculated, went "to the country with language which they could, where
necessary, defend against damaging alarms raised by the opposition but which
at the same time was sufficiently elastic to permit reasonable future ad-
vances." 276 To speak plainly, Bickel's hypothesis is that the Republicans
concealed the future objectives they dared not avow lest the whole enterprise
be imperilled. To my remark that this was "playing a trick upon an unsuspect-
ing people," Ely replied, "[o]btaining ratification of open-ended language in
the expectation that it will be given an open-ended interpretation is not play-
ing a trick." 277  Senator Fessenden defined a trick as doing
"something ... which you cannot do if you made it plain to their [the
people's] senses., 278 Concealment is implicit in Ely's own formulation: "The
recognition that there was racism in society doubtless was one reason the
framers chose open-ended language capable of development over time.'' 2"
The "expectation" of an interpretation contrary to prevalent racism was not
revealed to the ratifiers; to the contrary, the amendment was presented to the
people as leaving suffrage in control of the states, without the slightest inti-
mation that the words contained a "dark and abstruse" contrary meaning.
Harry Flack, who searched the newspapers of the period, and who fore-
shadowed the Bickel theory, concluded that "had the people been informed
of what was intended by the Amendment, they would have rejected it. ' ' 2w Of
course there is not a shred of evidence of such a purpose; it is a figment of
274. Berger, Government by Judiciary: John Hart Ely's "'Initation, " 54 IND. L.J. 277. 304-05 (1979).
275. See text accompanying note 125 supra. Professor Willard Hurst wrote: "If the idea of a document of
superior legal authority is to have meaning, terms ... [to which the framers attach a clear meaning] must be
held to that precise meaning." Hurst, The Process of Constitational Constraction--The Role of History, in
SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 55, 57 (E. Cahn ed. 1954). See also the statement by Charles Sumner in
note 184 supra.
276. Berger. Government by Judiciary: John Hart ElY's "hwitation," 54 IND. L.J. 277. 305 (1979).
277. ELY, supra note I. at 200 n.69.
278. Berger, Goverment by Judiciaty: John Hart Elyss "Invitation." 54 IND. L.J. 277, 306 (1979).
279. ELY, supra note 1, at 200 n.70.
280. H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 104-05 n.21, 237 (1903).
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activist speculation. Nor can the people have ratified what was not dis-
closed.28'
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A CLAUSE-BOUND INTERPRETATION
Ely's "impossible clause-bound interpretation" is a strawman, opposing
an imaginary exclusive focus on "self-contained units" to construction, for
example, of the ninth amendment "by exploring the nature of the rest of the
document., 282 Only a tyro would insist that any one provision must be studied
in isolation from the rest of the document. Interpretivists object, rather, to the
judicial imposition of values drawn from outside the Constitution.283 In fact,
the rights of the sovereign people retained by the ninth amendment are un-
limited and therefore defy comparison with those enumerated, let alone that it
was not meant to enlarge federal powers. Resort to the "rest of the docu-
ment" to explain the fourteenth amendment raises still other problems. The
framers unmistakably recorded their determination to exclude suffrage from
the amendment. Were antecedent provisions, contrary to the fact, to con-
tradict that intention, they would have to yield to the later provision.
But let us follow Ely in his explorations and sample his far-fetched in-
ferences. He opines that "[t]he Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses
prove on analysis to be separation of power provisions, enjoining the legis-
lature to act prospectively and by general rule (just as the judiciary is implicit-
ly enjoined by Article III to act retrospectively and by specific decree)."-28 No
separation of powers, but rather the patent injustice of condemning a man
retroactively for an act that was innocent when performed, motivated opposi-
tion to ex post facto laws. Since such laws apply only to criminal and penal
language, legislatures remain free to legislate retrospectively in civil, non-
penal cases.285 So too the vice of bills of attainder was not that they were
legislative adjudications but that they were legislative condemnations to death
without trial,28 whereas impeachment by Congress after trial was adopted. As
Justice Samuel Chase summarized, bills of attainder and ex post facto laws
had been products of "vindictive malice. To prevent such, and similar acts of
281. For citations, see R. BERGER. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 155 n.93 (1977).
282. ELY. supra note I. at 12. 228 n.89 (emphasis added).
283. To appeal, for example. to the"cruel and unusual punishment" provisions as calling "for a reference
to sources beyond the document itself."/id. at 13. does little to illuminate our suffrage issue. Common law terms
or institutions, such as "bill of attainder," "ex post facto," "trial by jury." necessarily require resort to the
common law usage they expressed. We have no legislative history to indicate that the framers attached a special
meaning to the "cruel and unusual" phrase, and so look to common law and contemporary practices. On the
other hand. the framers unmistakably recorded their determination to exclude suffrage from the fourteenth
amendment, and Ely would have us look "outside the document" to reverse that intention.
284. ELY, supra note 1. at 90 (emphasis added).
285. Berger, Bills of Attainder: A Study of Amendment by the Court, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 355, 365-67
(1978); Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 413 (1829): "There is nothing in the Constitution of the
United States, which forbids the legislature of a State to exercise judicial functions."
286. Berger, Bills of Attainder, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 355, 356-57 (1978).
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violence and injustice, I believe the Federal and State Legislatures were
prohibited from passing any bill of atainder; or any ex post facto law."
287
Ely's efforts to derive "equal protection" from earlier provisions of the
Constitution are similarly flawed. He considers that the more "obvious"
strategy to "protect the interests of minorities from the potentially destructive
will of some majority coalition" was the "'list' strategy employed by the Bill
of Rights, itemizing things that cannot be done to any one," though these
"safeguards turn out to be mainly procedural., 288 What is obvious to Ely is
hidden from one who reads Madison's explanation of the proposed Bill in the
First Congress: "the great mass" of the opposition disliked the Constitution
"because it did not contain.., those safeguards which they have long been
accustomed to have interposed between them and the magistrate .... "
And he said that "[t]he people of many States [not minorities in any State]
have thought it necessary to raise barriers against power in all forms and
departments of Government. ' ' 290 Ely notices that amendments five through
eight are "instrumental provisions calculated to enhance the fairness and
efficiency of the litigation process." 29' Any American, not merely a member
of a minority, might find himself embroiled in litigation or the criminal process
and wish to be protected by the traditional safeguards comprised in the
"rights of an Englishman." It is no mean feat to translate provisions designed
for the benefit of all into instruments for the special protection of minority
interests.
Again, Ely says of the privileges or immunities clause of article IV, "An
ethical ideal of equality is certainly working here, but the reason inequalities
against nonresidents and not others were singled out for prohibition in the
original document is obvious: nonresidents are a paradigmatically powerless
class politically., 292 The progenitor clause in article IV of the Articles of
Confederation explained that it was designed "[t]he better to secure and
perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the differ-
ent states in this union," to promote "trade and commerce." 293 This was a
prime necessity if abrasive trade barriers between the thirteen independent
state sovereignties were to be breached. 24 The intense state jealousy of
federal power2 95 would have repelled any suggestion of interference with state
287. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386. 389 (1798). See R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL PROBLEMS 27 (1973).
288. ELY. supra note I. at 79-80.
289. I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 433 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1836) (print bearing running title "'History of
Congress").
290. Id. at 436.
291. ELY. supra note 1. at 95.
292. Id. at 83. See also id. at 90-91.
293. H. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 111 (7th ed. 1%3).
294. For Madison's summary of reprehensible state practices, see 3 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 547-48 (1911).
295. For citations, see R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 260-62 (1969). Referring to the
Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court stated that, "'so far from the States which insisted upon these amendments
contemplating any restraint or limitation by them on their own powers; the very cause which gave rise to them,
was a strong jealousy on their part of the power which they had granted in the Constitution." Holmes v.
Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 587 (1840). See note 246 supra (statement by Madison).
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political processes, whereas obstacles to free trade on a national scale were a
drag on the Union. It is no accident that Ely cites no manifestation of concern
in the Convention for the "politically powerless." To the contrary,
Gouverneur Morris, advocate of the propertied minority, stated that "within
the State itself a majority must rule, whatever may be the mischief done
among themselves.'- 296
In Ely's eyes, the fourth amendment can be seen as "another harbinger
of the Equal Protection Clause, concerned with avoiding indefensible in-
equities in treatment," apparently because it called for a search warrant and
the judgment of a "neutral and detached magistrate," thereby minimizing
"arbitrariness and invidiousness in the making of such decisions" and "as-
suring the protection of minorities.- 2 97 But the amendment applied to all
searches, not merely searches of disparaged minorities; the entire American
people wanted to be protected against warrantless searches by a remote and
suspect newcomer, the national government.298 In this they were united, not
fragmented-the source of discrimination. Ely notices that Bingham, drafts-
man of the fourteenth amendment, initially "thought that an equal protection
concept was part of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause," but "came
during the debates to recognize that his understanding was unusual" (a stun-
ning understatement) and "added an Equal Protection Clause to the Due
Process Clause.- 299 What was not to be found in the "catch-all" due process
clause is with even greater difficulty located in its specialized companion
provisions. It would unduly burden these pages and weary the reader to
examine Ely's other interpretations of the Bill of Rights. As Gordon Wood
observed of the founders: "It was conceivable to protect the common liber-
ties of the people against their rulers, but hardly against the people them-
selves." 30 Ely's approach to the Bill of Rights recalls the apocryphal editor
296. 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 439 (1911). James
Wilson stated in the Convention that the "'majority... would be no more governed by interest than the
minority-it was surely better to let the latter be bound hand and foot than the former." Id. at 451. See text
accompanying note 327 infra.
297. ELY. supra note I. at 97. 172.
298. Compare the intense resentment aroused by the British writs of assistance (general warrants) in 1761.
S. MORRISON. OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 183 (1965).
299. ELY. supra note I. at 202 n.79.
300. G. WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 63 (1969). This was strikingly ex-
emplified by the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641: "'No man's life shall be taken away .... no man's
goods or estaite shall be taken away from him ... unless it be by vertue or equities of some expresse law of the
Country ... established by a generall Court [Assembly] and sufficiently published." Hazeltine. The Jlfluence
ofMagna Carta on American Constitntional Development in. MAGNA CARTA: COMMEMORATION ESSAYS 193
(H. Malden ed. 1917). Rodney Mott commented. "The wording indicated that it was intended that there should
be no limitation upon the legislative power, and that it merely required that the law be published .... R. MOTT,
DUE PROCESS OF LAW 93-94 (1926). A Rhode Island law of 1647 similarly provided: "'no person ... shall be
taken or imprisoned . .. but by the lawful judgment of his peers. or by some known law ... ratified and
confirmed by the major part of the General Assembly." THE EARLIEST ACTS AND LAWS OFTHE COLONY OF
RHODE ISLAND & PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS 1647-1719 12 (J. Cushing ed. 1977). Speaking of the Bill of
Rights, Chief Justice Marshall said: "Had Congress engaged in the extraordinary occupation of improving the
constitutions of the several states by affording the people additional protection from the exercise of power by
their own governments in matters which concerned themselves alone, they would have declared this purpose in
plain and intelligible language." Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833). See also note 156 supra.
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of the New Masses who instructed a neophyte respecting a collision between a
Cadillac and a Model-T Ford--"class angle it."
Minorities and Virtual Representation
Ely's zeal for minority "entitlements" leads him, as we have seen, to
read "equality" into the most unlikely provisions, relying on far-fetched in-
ferences for judicial power to fashion novel minority "rights." As he himself
notes, "[T]he original Constitution was principally, indeed I would say over-
whelmingly, dedicated to concerns of process and structure and not to the
identification and preservation of specific substantive values."- 30 1 Such indi-
vidual rights as were enumerated in the 1787 Constitution dealt with security
of property, commerce, and contracts. Broader individual rights are first met
in the Bill of Rights, largely to safeguard established criminal procedures in
prosecutions by the federal government, applicable to all of the people, not
any particular minority. "The general strategy," Ely observes, has "not been
to root in the document a set of substantive rights entitled to permanent
protection. 302
For long it was premised that the rights of minorities "protected by
courts were established in the Constitution. , 303 A perfervid apologist for an
activist Court, Professor Paul Brest, candidly acknowledges that "[mi]any of
what we have come to regard as the irreducible minima of rights, are actually
supraconstitutional; almost none of the others are entailed by the text or
original understanding. ,3 4 In other words, most minority "rights" are judge-
made, without roots in the Constitution. Professor Robert Bork justly con-
cludes that "not even a scintilla of evidence supports the argument that the
framers and ratifiers of the various amendments intended the judiciary to
develop new individual rights, which correspondingly create new disabilities
for democratic government. 305 In fact, the records convincingly establish,
for example, that the framers of the fourteenth amendment intended to ex-
clude such crucial rights as suffrage and segregation. Apart from his "invita-
tion" and "virtual representation" theories, Ely makes no pretense of justify-
ing judicial creativity by constitutional grant; instead, once we "identify those
groups in society to whose needs and wishes elected officials have no ap-
parent interest in attending ... it would not make sense to assign its enforce-
301. ELY. supra note I. at 92. See also id. at 90; L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 3 (1972).
302. ELY, supra note I. at 100.
303. Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities. 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1173 (1977).
304. Brest. The Misconceived Quest for the original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204,236 (1980). "We
are repeatedly told by the courts that the current egalitarianism which they are helping to impose derives from
the Constitution. That. I think, is arrant nonsense. It is not being taken from the Constitution, it is being put into
it." Kurland, Ruminiations on the Quality of Equalit., 1979 B.Y.U.L. REV. 7, 8. "-It is not the province of this
court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.*' San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973). See note 156 supra (statement ofiJustice
Miller).
305. Bork, Tire hmpossibilitv of Finding Welfare Rights in tire Constitution. 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695.697.
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ment to anyone but the courts. " 3 This is an argument of expedience, not of
constitutional authorization. The founders, however, did not share Ely's con-
cerns; for them "individual rights, even the basic civil liberties that we con-
sider so crucial, possessed little of their modem theoretical relevance when
set against the will of the people." 30 7 Like Elbridge Gerry, they relied "on the
Representatives of the people [not the courts] as the guardians of their Rights
and Interests.
03
Ely is aware that "rule in accord with the consent of a majority of those
governed is the core of the American governmental system," that "[o]ur
constitutional development over the past century has ... substantially
strengthened the original commitment to control by a majority of the gov-
erned."' 3°9 He observes that in part the Civil War was "about whether a
national majority could control the conduct of a group that in national terms
constituted a minority," and that it demonstrated "the strength of the ma-
jority's resolve that this nation remain controllable by majority will, ' 30 even
though it involved a gigantic expropriation. When the North struck the
shackles of slavery from the blacks, it did not clothe them with all of the rights
the majority enjoyed; it unmistakably excluded suffrage and segregation from
the fourteenth amendment and proscribed discrimination only with respect to
such rights as were essential to the very existence of the freedmen.31' Charles
Sumner averred that if the fourteenth amendment is "inadequate to protect
persons in ... their right to vote, it is inadequate to protect them in any-
thing."3
12
To this Ely opposes his theory of "virtual representation"-elected
officials must "represent" minorities; he maintains that the founders en-
visioned a "republic" in which "the representatives would govern in the
interest of the whole people., 31 3 In the Revolutionary period, however, there
was great "confusion about representation present in American thinking";
there was, said Gordon Wood, a "growing sense that the representative was
merely a limited agent or spokesman for the local interests of his constituents
in the decade after Independence .... [which] destroyed the traditional char-
acter of representation, ' 31 4 i.e. the English "virtual representation," a term
306. ELY. supra note I. at 15 1. Professor Joseph W. Bishop, Jr. wrote of liberals that "they obviously have
no faith whatever in the wisdom or will of the great majority of the people, who are opposed to them. They are
doing everything possible to have those problems resolved by a small minority in the courts .... -Bishop, What
is a Liberal-Who is a Conservative, 62 COMMENTARY 47 (1976).
307. G. WOOD. CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 63 (1969).
308. 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 75 (1911).
309. ELY, supra note I. at 7.
310. Id. at 187-88 n.24.
311. As William Lawrence declared, "'It is a mockery to say that a citizen may have a right to live, and yet
deny him the right to make a contract to secure the privilege and the rewards of labor." CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., Ist Sess. 1833 (1866).
312. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1008 (1869).
313. ELY, supra note I, at 79.
314. G. WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 173, 185, 387 (1%9).
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that, as Ely notes, "was anathema to our forefathers."315 So far as my reading
goes, if the framers departed from that view they left no trace in the Conven-
tion records. To the contrary, Gouverneur Morris said that "within the State
itself, a majority must rule, whatever may be the mischief among them-
selves. 3 16 Correction of majority excesses against the propertied minority,
Madison explained, generated such express safeguards as the contracts clause
and prohibition of paper emission, believing that under the constitutional
division of "the powers of Government [state and federal] ... unjust majori-
ties would be formed with still more difficulty, and be therefore the less to be
dreaded .... Quite different safeguards were contemplated for "repre-
sentation."
Federalist No. 57 explained that the House would be restrained from
"oppressive measures" because "they can make no law which will not have
full operation on themselves ... as well as on the great mass of the soci-
ety .... If it be asked, what is to restrain the House of Representatives from
making legal discriminations in favor of themselves and a particular class of
the society? I answer: the genius of the whole system" and similar factors," 8
from which judicial interposition was notably absent, it being Madison's view
that courts enforce "express provisions." In addition, Ely notes the "Con-
stitution's more pervasive strategy... of pluralism," i.e. "although at a
local level one 'faction' might well have sufficient clout to be able to tyrannize
others [ruling out virtual representation at the local level], in the national
government no faction or interest group would constitute a majority capable
of exercising control."0"'9 There was a feeling, Ely comments, that "'the
people' were an essentially homogeneous group whose interests did not vary
315. ELY. supra note I, at 82. Ely finds that "'virtual representation-'" nevertheless influenced the article
IV safeguard for the 'politically powerless." Id. at 83. But see text accompanying notes 292-96 supra.
316. 2 M. FARRAND. RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 439 (1911). Madison
said in FEDERALIST NO. 10 at 57 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937): "'If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is
supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It
may clog the administration, it may convulse the society, but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence
under the forms of the Constitution." In this connection, it is noteworthy that the founders accepted malap-
portionment. Nathaniel Gorham said in the Convention: "'[T]he Constitution of Massachusetts had provided
that the [representation of the] larger districts should not be in an exact ratio to their numbers. And experience
he thought had shewn the provision to be expedient." I M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 405 (1911). Michael Stone stated in the First Congress that "the representatives of the
States were chosen by the States in the manner they pleased." I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 769 (Gales & Seaton
eds. 1836) (print bearing running title "'History of Congress"). James Wilson took account of the disparate State
exclusions from suffrage. For details and citations see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 89 (1977). In
1853. Charles Sumner defended the disproportionate Massachusetts representation. Id. at 73-74. James Blaine
recognized it in 1866. Id. See also statements of Ben Butler, id. at 74. And see also note 221 supra. and note 296
supra (statement of Wilson).
317. 4 M. FARRAND. RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 86-87 (1911).
318. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 at 373 (J. Madison)(Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). To curb the willfulness of factious
majorities, Madison relied on passing their views "through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose
wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love ofjustice will be least
likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations." FEDERALIST NO. 10 at 59 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
Whether -'representation" of minorities was adequate was thus left to the -'wisdom" of the representative body
itself, not to a supervisory court. Cf. note 300 supra.
319. ELY, supra note I. at 80.
[Vol. 42:87
significantly.- 3 20 But by the time "the republic approached its fiftieth birth-
day" that view had run its course. "Simultaneously," Ely remarks, "we
came to recognize that the existing constitutional devices for protecting
minorities were simply not sufficient, ' 3 21 that the "existing theory of repre-
sentation had to be extended" so that a representativ "would not sever a
majority coalition's interests from those of various minorities.- 3 22 Thus, Ely
confesses that an "extension" was required to correct the absence of existing
constitutional protection. That cannot, however, be supplied by theorizing
nor by judicial decree, but as Madison indicated in another context, the want
requires an amendment.323 Then too, although the framers and ratifiers of the
fourteenth amendment narrowly limited the privileges conferred on the freed-
men, on Ely's reasoning the electors nevertheless were bound thereafter to
confer upon them whatever privileges the white "majority" conferred upon
themselves. "Virtual representation" is thus merely another device for nulli-
fying the will of the framers and ratifiers.
In truth, Ely, while paying lip service to majority rule, 24 would sap it.
What matters it that, as Madison stated, "the majority in each State must
bind the minority, ' 32 if a majority victory at the polls burdens it with de-
feated minority claims. Elected officials represent those who elected them
326
and are not bound to carry out the desires of the losers. Ely would have the
tail wag the dog. In Hamilton's words, "To give a minority a negative upon
the majority ... is, in its tendency, to subject the sense of the greatest number
to that of the lesser. , 327 No verbal gymnastics can disguise that effect. Ely
recognizes the contradiction:
It will not do simply to say "the majority rules but the majority does not rule."
The problem for a noninterpretivist approach has been convincingly to distinguish
itself from just this sort of bald contradiction. There have been attempts to do
so... but they have generally been halting and apologetic .... 328
His own reconciliation of the "contradiction" is by way of an "heroic in-
ference"-"open-minded" provisions constitute an "invitation" to judicial
enactment of an "unwritten Constitution," reinforced by his "virtual repre-
320. Id. at 79.
321. Id. at 81.
322. Id. at 82.
32-3. Madison stated, "Had the power of making treaties, for example, been omitted, however necessary it
might have been, the defect could only have been lamented, or supplied by an amendment to the Constitution."
2 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1900-01 (1791).
324. Ely reminds us that "most Americans would reject many provisions of the Bill of Rights," ELY, supra
note i, at 189 n.2, intimating that Big Brother knows best. Should the people by amendment decide to supersede
one or the other of its provisions, I would say with Justice Holmes, "whether I like it or not, 'God' dammit, let
"em do it." C. CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 281 (1947).
325. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 at 247 (J. Madison)(Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). See text accompanying note 316
supra.
326. See text accompanying note 314 supra. See also ELY, supra note 1, at 129.
327. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 at 135 (A. Hamilton)(Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). See note 296 supra (statement of
Wilson).
328. ELY. supra note I. at 8.
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sentation" theory, illustrating once more how commitment to a cause warps
judgment.3 29
Ely deludes himself in thinking he has succeeded where others have
failed. Already he is rejected by fellow academicians. So Bork considers Ely's
"[r]epresentation-reinforcement could take us back to Lochner";330 Mark
Tushnet observes that it "necessarily involves judicial displacement of citi-
zens' choices between political and other kinds of activity, in the name of the
objective value of political participation." 3 3  Such accounts, as Ely's Harvard
colleague Lawrence Tribe remarks, permit courts to "portray themselves as
servants of democracy even as they strike down the actions of supposedly
democratic governments.- 332 For my part, Paul Brest's frank avowal is to be
preferred: judges are not bound by the Constitution.33 That brings the legiti-
macy of judicial activism into the open, and frames the issue in a way the
people can understand, and, understanding, can be counted on to take ap-
propriate action.
329. Ely is aware that "prejudice is a lens that distorts reality," id. at 153. but apparently is unaware that
the "process of finding 'good' reasons to justify our routine beliefs-is known to modem psychologists as
.rationalizing.' ... Our 'good' reasons ordinarily... are at bottom the result of personal preference or preju-
dice, and not of an honest desire to seek oraccept new knowledge." J. ROBINSON.THE MIND INTHE MAKING
44 (1921).
330. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695,700.
331. Tushnet, Darkness at the Edge of Town: The Contributions ofJohn Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory,
89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1038 (1980).
332. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1930).
333. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204,224 (1980). For
comment, see Berger, Paul Brest's Brieffor an Imperial Judiciary, - MD. L. REV. - (1980). For similar
claims, see Miller, Do the Founding Fathers Know Best?, Wash. Post. Nov. 13, 1977, § E at 8, col. 2; Cover,
Book Review, NEW REPUBLIC 26 (Jan. 14, 1978); Forrester, Are We Ready for Truth in Judging?. 63 A.B.AJ.
1212, 1215 (1977); White, Reflections on the Role of tire Supreme Court: Tire Contemporary Debate and the
"Lessons" of History, 63 JUDICATURE 162 (1979).
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